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This dissertation provides a cultural-cognitive perspective on the relationship 
between cooperation and competition within organizations.  Instead of explicitly defining 
the relationship between cooperation and competition, I examine lay beliefs about the 
relationship and the impact of these beliefs on perceptions and behavior.   
This dissertation consists of two studies.  In the first study, I examine the role of 
peoples’ categorization of competitive behaviors as cooperative or non-cooperative in 
teams. I assess the influence of dialectical reasoning, a culturally-shaped reasoning style, 
on the categorization of competitive behaviors and the reaction to competitive behaviors 
within teams. I test my predictions with a laboratory experiment with participants in the 
US and China. The analyses from this study reveal cultural differences in perceptual and 
behavioral reactions to competitive behaviors, with differences partially attributed to 
reasoning style and categorization. 
 vii 
In the second study, I examine the role of people’s categorization of competitive 
behaviors as cooperative or non-cooperative in working relationships.  I assess the 
influence of culture and categorization on people’s ego-centric network of working 
relationships.  I test my predictions with a survey of working professionals in the US and 
China. The analyses from this study demonstrate that people who categorize certain 
competitive behaviors as cooperative are more likely to be more cooperative with people 
they are more competitive with instead of having exclusively cooperative or competitive 
relationships.  The analyses also reveal national cultural differences in people’s networks 
of working relationships that are partially attributable to categorization of competitive 
behaviors. 
By empirically connecting culture and reasoning style to cooperative and 
competitive behavior in teams and working relationships, this research enhances our 
understanding of fundamental aspects of organizations, suggesting a new approach to 
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The initial motivation for this dissertation comes from a reflection of my 
observations as a manager at an Internet company from 2000-2001. The company was 
engaged in a software development project staffed by a team of American and Indian 
programmers based in Dallas and a team of Chinese programmers based in Shanghai.  
One day, an American programmer, John, complained to me that a Chinese 
programmer, Lewin, was not cooperating1. I was surprised to hear an American comment 
about a lack of cooperation by someone in China, as I had always believed that Chinese 
employees were generally cooperative. Nevertheless, I tried to subtly suggest to Lewin 
that John believed he wasn’t cooperating sufficiently. Lewin responded kindly and said 
that he will do his best to work as hard on the project as possible.  
Weeks later, John approached me again. He threatened to leave the project if 
Lewin wouldn’t cooperate more. He said: 
 "Lewin is still not cooperating. He wanted to beat me at everything—more code, 
newer code, fewer bugs. I can only cooperate for so long when he’s acting so 
competitively.‖   
I then went to Lewin again and asked him bluntly why is he is not cooperating 
with John. Lewin looked confused and responded by saying:  
―I am cooperating. I am working as hard as I can on this project.‖   
                                                          
1 The names used have been fictionalized. 
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―Are you trying to compete with John?‖ 
―Yes, I am.‖ 
―So you’re not really trying to cooperate, are you?‖ 
―Yes, I am. That’s why I’m competing.‖   
I was perplexed. Lewin did not change his behavior and John followed up on his 
threat and left the team. The project fell apart.  
INTRODUCING A LAY PERSPECTIVE OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 
 
Theories about lay beliefs (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 
2001) and dialectical reasoning (Peng & Nisbett, 1999) are useful for analyzing this event. 
It is possible that John and I believed that Lewin’s action was competitive and non-
cooperative, whereas Lewin believed that his action was both competitive and 
cooperative. John and I probably believed that any instance of competition must be non-
cooperative, whereas Lewin probably believed that some instances of competition can 
also be cooperative. We differed in our beliefs, leading to misunderstanding and failure. 
An examination of peoples’ lay beliefs is not new to research in organizations. 
Previous literature has discussed lay beliefs about the self (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 
1997; Dweck et al., 1995), peoples’ abilities (Sue-Chan & Wood, 2009), negotiations 
processes (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), and creativity (Runco & Bahleda, 1987). Other 
literature has looked specifically at lay beliefs about the relationship between two 
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categories, including the categories of ―threats‖ and ―opportunities‖ (Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988) and ―work‖ and ―play‖ (Glynn, 1994). But despite a 
plethora of research on the relationship between cooperation and competition in 
organizations (e.g. Johnson & Johnson, 1989), our knowledge of people’s lay beliefs 
about the relationship between cooperation and competition is limited. 
A more comprehensive examination of lay beliefs on the relationship between 
cooperation and competition is important for several reasons. First, a discussion of 
cooperation and competition is not limited to scholars. ―Cooperation‖ and ―competition‖ 
are popular cultural categories (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005; D'Andrade, 1995; Romney 
& Moore, 1998; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) that people use to make sense of their 
everyday experience. For example, in the United States, there are currently over 300,000 
books referencing ―cooperation‖, over 400,000 books referencing ―competition‖, and 
over 15,000 books referencing both ―cooperation‖ and ―competition‖ sold on 
Amazon.com. There are also over 2,000 articles referencing ―cooperation‖, over 5,000 
articles referencing ―competition‖ and over 200 articles referencing both ―cooperation‖ 
and ―competition‖ on Factiva on a given day. The ubiquity of their presence in everyday 
life is likely to transfer to people’s organizational experience. Second, organizations are 
interpretive systems (Daft & Weick, 1984). A complete understanding of how 
organizational members make sense of their organizational experience should include an 
understanding of how people interpret fundamental organizational categories such as 
cooperation and competition. Finally, cooperation and competition are conventionally 
 4 
treated as opposites (e.g., Beersma et al., 2003). An understanding of how organizational 
members think about the relationship between cooperation and competition may provide 
insight into how organizational members think generally about opposites.  
This dissertation examines lay beliefs about the relationship between cooperation 
and competition. I also examine the effects of these beliefs on both immediate outcomes 
within a team context and long-term outcomes in working relationships within an 
organization. I examine peoples’ categories of cooperation and competition, and their 
dialectical reasoning, a culturally-influenced reasoning style about opposites 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). This provides an 
understanding of people’s specific beliefs about the relationship between cooperation and 
cognition and their general beliefs about opposites. I examine cross-national comparisons 
in beliefs between the US and China, and examine the underlying mechanisms that 
mediate cross-national differences. As a result, this dissertation does not only aim to 
provide a better understanding of the relationship between cooperation and competition, 
but to provide a broader understanding of the connection between culture, reasoning, 
knowledge, and behavior in multiple organizational contexts.  
STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
 This is a two study dissertation. In the first study, I examine people’s thoughts 
about cooperation and competition within the team context. I assess the influence of 
dialecticism on people’s categorization of competitive behaviors and people’s reaction to 
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competitive behaviors within a team. This study connects culture to cognition to 
immediate behavioral outcomes. In the second study, I examine the influence of people’s 
thoughts about cooperation and competition within the larger organizational context. I 
assess the influence of people’s categorization of competitive behaviors on the 
cooperativeness of people’s working relationships and networks of working relationships 
within the organization. To maintain the relative independence of the two studies, a few 
limited passages in each study has similar content. I conclude with a brief conclusion that 
connects both studies.  
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STUDY 1: DIALECTICAL REASONING & COOPETITION IN 
TEAMS   
Introduction 
Cognition has long been considered an important aspect of team functioning (see 
Salas & Fiore, 2004 for a review). Most literature on cognition within teams relates to 
knowledge about the current task or team members (e.g., Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, 
Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). But other forms of cognition within teams are shaped 
by factors that reside outside of the current team, including national culture (Jelinek & 
Wilson, 1995; Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006). Previous literature has identified several 
national cultural influences on team members’ knowledge content, including team 
member beliefs about the amount of agency of individuals within the team (Kashima et 
al., 2005; Morris, Menon, & Ames, 2001), the metaphors that team members use to 
conceptualize teamwork (Gibson & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2001), the social categories that team 
members use to make inferences about other members (Chatman & Flynn, 2001; 
Stroessner, 1996), and the categories that team members use to interpret other team 
members’ behavior (Keller & Loewenstein, Working Paper). But culture shapes not only 
knowledge content, which pertains to what people know (Burger & Luckman, 1967; 
Douglas, 1986), but also reasoning, which pertains to how people use and think about 
what they know (Medin, Ross, Atran, Burnett, & Blok, 2002; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001).  
  In this study, I focus on culture’s influence on reasoning and the implications for 
behavior in teams. First, I examine dialectical reasoning, which is a culturally-influenced 
reasoning style about opposites. Second, I assess how dialectical reasoning influences 
people’s use of the categories of cooperation and competition. Third, I assess how that 
use of cooperation and competition affects reciprocity in teams—specifically, how team 
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members react to other team members’ competitive behaviors. My study therefore aims 
to contribute to literature on teams by introducing a role for culturally-shaped reasoning 
and connecting this reasoning to two fundamental kinds of team behavior; cooperation 
and competition.  
DIALECTICAL REASONING 
A complete account of cognition in teams, like any complete account of 
cognition, has to examine both content (i.e., knowledge) and processes (including 
reasoning) that act on that content (Anderson, 1983; Palmer, 1978). For example, a 
team’s ability to develop a transactive memory system depends on each team member 
having both knowledge about other members’ expertise and processes for encoding, 
storing and retrieving the other members’ knowledge (Hollingshead, 1998; Lewis, 2003; 
Wegner, 1986). As a second example, a team’s ability to make accurate group decisions 
can depend on both knowledge from other team members and whether team members use 
counterfactual reasoning to process that knowledge (Galinsky & Kray, 2004). What I will 
examine is one fundamental kind of knowledge content, opposites (Fiol, 2002; Weber, 
Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008) and a knowledge process, reasoning about opposites.  
Organizations and teams constantly face seemingly paradoxical or contradictory 
situations involving the joint occurrence of opposite phenomena, making the reasoning of 
opposites particularly important for organizations (Poole & Ven, 1989; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1988) and teams (Miron-Spektor & Argote, 2008; Smith & Tushman, 2005).  
For example, teams may be confronting simultaneous demands for both autonomy and 
democracy (Quinn & Cameron, 1988).  When approaching potentially contradictory 
situations, people can vary in their reasoning of the opposites by either integrating both 
opposites or differentiating between the two opposites (Smith & Tushman, 2005).  For 
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example, if someone sees a normally helpful person stealing from their team members, a 
person may integrate helping and stealing by thinking about how the stealing may 
reinforce helping (perhaps it was being done to teach an important lesson). Alternatively, 
a person may differentiate by either changing opinions of the colleague or seeking 
reasons why the instance of stealing was an exception.  
The reasoning of opposites is shaped by culture, as people acquire lay ontological 
theories about knowledge through cultural artifacts and social interactions within each 
cultural group (Hong et al., 2001).  A key culturally-influenced reasoning style about 
opposites is dialectical reasoning (Norenzayan et al., 2002; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004). Dialectical reasoning involves a general 
propensity to integrate and not differentiate when faced with a contradiction. Dialectical 
reasoning stems from two lay ontological theories.  A lay theory of contradiction holds 
that two ostensibly contradictory concepts can both be true (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, 
Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009). An associated lay theory of change asserts that the universe 
is unpredictable and dynamic, therefore what may be the same at one point of time may 
be different at another point of time (and vice-versa) (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009).   
People acquire dialectical reasoning from external cultural artifacts such as stories 
and proverbs (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).  They typically acquire it during adolescence or 
young adulthood, because it is a relatively complex form of reasoning (Basseches, 1984).  
Dialectical reasoning is instantiated in cultural artifacts in a wide variety of cultures. It is 
relatively rare in Western culture, although it does appear in some modern Western 
philosophy (Walton, 1990). It is addressed by Hegel (Gadamer & Smith, 1982), Marx 
(Marx, Fowkes, Mandel, & Fernbach, 1976) and Habermas (Ingram, 1989). But it has not 
had a major impact on general lay beliefs in Western culture (Samson, 2004).  In contrast, 
cultural artifacts that emphasize dialectical reasoning are prevalent in Chinese, Japanese 
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and Korean cultures (Peng, Spencer-Rodgers, & Zhong, 2006). Its meaning is 
exemplified in the 阴阳(Yin-Yang) symbol found in the classic text 易经 (Yi Jing, Book of 
Changes; Willhelm & Baynes, 1961), demonstrating that black and white are part of one 
whole. The integration of opposites is a prominent feature in Laozi’s 道德经 (Dao De 
Jing; Lao, 1982), and is associated with wisdom. The virtue of finding a ―middle way‖ 
between two extremes is also found in Confucius’ 中庸 (Zhong Yong, Doctrine of the 
Mean; Confucius, 2004). In China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam, these texts have long been 
canonized (Schwartz, 1985), and dialectical reasoning has long permeated stories, 
proverbs and other commonplace cultural artifacts within East Asian societies (Peng et 
al., 1999).  
Because greater access to cultural artifacts makes knowledge associated with 
those artifacts more culturally accessible (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000), 
people in East Asia, relative to those in Western nations, are more familiar with 
dialectical reasoning (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). As a 
result, East Asians, such as people in China, are more likely to have a general disposition 
towards dialectical reasoning, and hence more likely use dialectical reasoning in multiple 
contexts (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). Therefore, in 
confirmation of previous findings and completeness in the current logic: 
 
H1: People in China have a higher propensity for dialectical reasoning than 
people in the US.      
 
One major influence of dialectical reasoning is as a guide to reasoning about 
cultural categories (Atran et al., 2005; D'Andrade, 1995; Romney et al., 1998). Cultural 
categories are social conventions (Millikan, 2005) generated by cultural groups for 
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labeling sets of objects, material practices, social actors and other socially experienced 
examples (Douglas, 1986; Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2007). People use categories that 
they believe are opposites (e.g., ―bad‖ and ―good‖, ―hot‖ and ―cold‖, ―black‖ and 
―white‖) to classify phenomena and to make inferences based on whether a phenomenon 
is classified in one category or in an opposing category (Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 
2001; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). But the inferences that people make based on 
seemingly opposite categories can be influenced by dialectical reasoning, and thus differ 
by national culture (Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997). Because dialectical reasoning 
includes a higher tolerance of contradictory propositions, people with more dialectical 
reasoning are more likely to believe that something and its opposite can both be true. 
Consequently, when something is a member of one category, people a higher propensity 
for dialectical reasoning should be more likely to believe that it can also be a member of 
the opposite category. For example, Choi and Nisbett (2000) found that Koreans, who as 
members of a society that has more cultural artifacts that emphasize dialectical reasoning, 
have, on average, a higher propensity for dialectical reasoning, were less surprised than 
Americans when they discovered that an honest person conducted a dishonest act or 
when an unhelpful person conducted a helpful act.  
COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION 
There are many seemingly opposite categories that are applicable to the team 
context. For example, people respond to task cues differently depending on whether the 
cues are categorized as ―work‖ or categorized as ―play‖ (Glynn, 1994). Because team 
members are in relationships that are both professional and interpersonal (Dirks, 1999), 
the way people categorize tasks may influence how they perceive their relationship with 
others. If team members believe that they must choose between tasks that involve ―work‖ 
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or ―play‖ as a signal for their relationship, they may believe they have to choose which 
tasks to engage in. Consequently, they may believe they must make a choice between 
productivity (for work) and cohesion (for play), even though the two team processes need 
not be mutually exclusive (Gammage, Carron, & Estabrooks, 2001). I suggest that 
whether someone believes they need to choose one or the other is a function of a person’s 
habitual use of dialectical reasoning. A person who habitually engages in dialectical 
reasoning should believe that team relationships can involve both work and play and 
therefore should not believe it is necessary to choose between either productivity or 
cohesion. Another example is the categorization of team roles of ―leader‖ and ―member‖ 
as hierarchical roles within the team (Dienesh, 1986; Gerstner & Day, 1997). How 
someone behaves may depend on whether they choose to fit a role that indicates ―leader‖ 
or a role that indicates ―member‖. However, using dialectical reasoning may allow 
members to believe they can be both leaders and members and so behave according to 
both roles.  
In this study, I focus on two categories that are conventionally treated as opposites 
and are central to team member relationships: ―cooperation‖ and ―competition‖. Most 
research on the relationship between cooperation and competition explicitly defines 
cooperation and competition as opposites (e.g., Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; 
Johnson et al., 1989). According to these views, team members are either in a competitive 
situation or in a cooperative situation (Deutsch, 1949), wanting to compete or wanting to 
cooperate (McClintock & Allison, 1989), acting competitively or acting cooperatively 
(Komorita & Parks, 1996). Conceptually and operationally, according to this view, the 
absence of cooperation indicates the presence of competition (and vice-versa). 
Consequently, most research on the relationship between cooperation and competition 
explores whether cooperation is more beneficial to teams (e.g., Qin, Johnson, & Johnson, 
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1995), competition is more beneficial to teams (e.g., Munkes & Diehl, 2003) or the 
moderators that influence whether cooperation or competition is more beneficial to teams 
(e.g., Beersma et al., 2003). Research has tended to treat cooperation and competition as 
opposites that are mutually exclusive. 
Recently, a set of related, alternative theoretical perspectives about the 
relationship between cooperation and competition has emerged. Typically referred to as 
―coopetition‖, these perspectives conceptualize cooperation and competition not as 
opposites, but as two distinct, potentially orthogonal dimensions (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996; Luo, 2005; Tsai, 2002). Conceptually and operationally, cooperation and 
competition can be both present.  Figure 1 illustrates this distinction from other theories.   
Coopetition has been conceptualized in different ways. According to one view, 
coopetition occurs when value creation (cooperation) and value claiming (competition) 
take place within the same relationship (Brandenburger et al., 1996). Value creation 
involves parties taking advantage of complementarities, such as through combining 
knowledge. Value claiming involves each party appropriating gains and trying to get the 
largest possible share of whatever value was created. For example, team members might 
simultaneously cooperate and compete by working together on a task (cooperation) and 
trying to earn relatively more credit for accomplishing the task (competition). According 
to a second view of coopetition, coopetition involves the combination of two distinct, 
orthogonal types of personalities; a cooperative personality and a competitive personality 
(Xie, Chen, Yu, & Chang, 2006). For example, a team member might have a general 
disposition towards wanting to help other members of the team (a cooperative 
personality). At the same time, the team member might also like being the most highly 
rewarded member of the team (a competitive personality).  
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I offer a third view of coopetition. I conceptualize coopetition as a form of 
categorization. Instead of generating a fixed definition for ―cooperation‖ and 
―competition‖, in this view ―cooperation‖ and ―competition‖ are treated as two distinct 
and potentially orthogonal cultural categories (i.e., categories generated by cultural 
groups, not researchers). Each cultural group decides whether a particular behavior can 
be a member of both, one or neither categories, as illustrated by Figure 2.  This view is 
related to Jackson and Dutton’s (1988) study of the relationship between threats and 
opportunities. They found that managers have the potential to categorize environmental 
issues as both threats and opportunities, exclusively as threats, exclusively as 
opportunities, or neither as threats nor as opportunities.  Similarly, if team members have 
two distinct, orthogonal categories of ―cooperation‖ and ―competition‖, even if they view 
cooperation and competition as a whole as opposites, they could categorize specific 
behaviors as cooperative and competitive (i.e., coopetive).  I define a team member’s 
propensity to categorize others’ behaviors as both cooperative and competitive as 
tendency for coopetive categorization. Team members who categorize many other team 
member behaviors as both cooperative and competitive have a high tendency for 
coopetive categorization, whereas team members who categorize most if not all 
competitive behaviors as non-cooperative (and vice-versa) have a low tendency for 
coopetive categorization.  
The potential for coopetive categorization does not guarantee that a team member 
would categorize a behavior as both cooperative and competitive. Coopetive 
categorization requires that a team member believes that a particular behavior is both 
cooperative and competitive. A major factor in whether a behavior is a member of a 
particular category is whether its features are similar to features of representative 
members of the category (Rosch, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981). As a result, coopetive 
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categorization is likely to hinge on whether a behavior can have central features of both 
cooperation and competition. According to Tyler and Blader (2000), the key feature of a 
cooperative behavior is that it benefits or limits harm to the group. According to Johnson 
and Johnson (1989), the key feature of competitive behavior is an attempt to attain a 
relatively higher position, so as to secure material or social gains. Therefore, if these 
research-defined features of cooperation and competition are also true of the cultural 
categories of cooperation and competition, then a behavior that is both beneficial to the 
group and also involves an attempt to attain a relatively higher position could be 
categorized as an instance of both cooperation and competition.  
Using the core features of cooperation and competition just discussed, I propose 
two kinds of competition, attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine, that are 
intended to differ in how readily they could be categorized as cooperation and as 
competition. I define attempts to outperform as behaviors that are intended to promote a 
team member’s status through increasing his or her own performance relative to other 
members. For example, a team member may try to finish a project faster than others to 
stake a claim that the team member is the hardest worker in the team. I suggest this is a 
type of competitive behavior because it has as a core feature a concern for relative 
standing. I also suggest this type of behavior could be perceived as cooperative because 
such actions indicate effort on group work. Task-related effort (as opposed to ―free-
riding‖) is a common feature of cooperation (Jones, 1984), and a behavior that benefits 
the group. The increased effort, if observed by other team members, could also lead those 
others to increase their effort, as team members reciprocate team-related effort (Price, 
2006). Consequently, there is the potential for an attempt to outperform—a kind of 
competitive behavior—to be beneficial to the group overall and therefore be perceived as 
cooperation. 
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In contrast, I define attempts to undermine as behaviors taken to increase some 
members’ relative standing by materially harming other team members. This is not 
constructive criticism, but sabotage. For example, team members might attempt to 
undermine others by providing them with false information that if used would lead them 
to take poor actions. This behavior seems likely to lower the team’s overall performance, 
especially given that the other team members are likely to respond to the attempt to 
undermine by engaging in additional harmful acts, creating a tit-for-tat downward spiral 
(Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Glomb & Liao, 2003). Therefore, attempts to undermine 
are likely to be perceived as competitive, and because they should also be harmful to the 
team as whole, they should not be perceived as cooperative.  
The distinction between attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine is 
related to a prior distinction in the social interdependence literature that also distinguishes 
between more and less harmful forms of competition (Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 
1999). That distinction is between zero-sum and appropriate competition. Zero-sum 
competition is defined as situations in which one team member wins and all others lose. 
Appropriate competition is defined as competition subject to the following stringent 
limitations: winning is relatively unimportant, all members have an equal chance to win, 
there are clear rules, and members can monitor each others’ performance (see also 
Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson, & Sun, 2003). The distinction I draw between attempts to 
outperform and attempts to undermine places many fewer restrictions on relevant 
situations, and so are relevant to a greater array of situations. Attempts to undermine are 
somewhat like zero-sum competition, except that it is possible for attempts to undermine 
to lead to lose-lose outcomes, not just win-lose outcomes. Attempts to outperform are 
somewhat like appropriate competition in emphasizing the possibility for group gains, but 
it only requires the monitoring assumption. Thus I rely on attempts to outperform and 
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attempts to undermine as types of competition because they apply more broadly than 
zero-sum and appropriate competition, and because they better fit a cultural category-
based approach. 
The earlier discussion of attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine 
implies a difference with respect to their category memberships. If team members’ lay 
beliefs about cooperation and competition follow the logic described, then attempts to 
outperform should be able to be categorized as both an instance of competition and an 
instance of cooperation. Attempts to undermine, in contrast, should be able to be 
categorized as an instance of competition but not as an instance of cooperation. 
Therefore, to capture the key distinction: 
 
H2: People will categorize team members’ attempts to outperform as more 
cooperative than team members’ attempts to undermine. 
 
DIALECTICAL REASONING AND COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION 
I have just argued that there is a type of team member behavior, attempts to 
outperform, that has the potential to be categorized as both cooperative and competitive. 
Now I turn to the question of why people would or would not categorize attempts to 
outperform as both cooperative and competitive (i.e., engage in coopetive categorization). 
I suggest people’s tendency to do so should be influenced by dialectical reasoning.  
Even though research on coopetition suggests that cooperation and competition 
can co-occur, as discussed earlier, cooperation and competition are typically viewed as 
opposites in research on teams (e.g., Deutsch, 1949), and this is echoed in research on 
inter-firm relations (e.g., Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997), and research on international 
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affairs (e.g., Esty, 1998). Cooperation and competition are also widely discussed as 
opposites in the popular press (e.g., Kohn, 1993). The words ―cooperation‖ and 
―competition‖ are also listed as antonyms in both English (Merriam-Webster, 2006) and 
Chinese (BWXY, 1978) thesauruses.  Therefore, there are grounds for claiming that 
cooperation and competition are, by social convention, deemed to be opposites in both 
the United States and China.  Consequently, people may be relatively unlikely to 
categorize competitive behaviors as also cooperative.  
Because cooperation and competition are commonly treated as opposites, whether 
people categorize a competitive behavior as also cooperative should be impacted by 
dialectical reasoning. As mentioned earlier, dialectical reasoning involves a tolerance for 
contradiction and a belief about change. Therefore, if a team member has a high 
propensity towards dialectical reasoning, the team member is more likely to tolerate the 
contradictory idea that a behavior can be both cooperative and competitive, even if the 
idea is counter-intuitive to the premise that cooperation and competition are opposites. 
The team member is also more likely to think about the relationship between cooperation 
and competition based on the current situation and not based on a universally applicable, 
standard rule. Consequently, the team member is more likely to discover a behavior that 
is both cooperative and competitive. Earlier I claimed that attempts to outperform could 
potentially be categorized as both cooperative and competitive, because the behavior 
exhibits features that represent both cooperation and competition. As a result, a higher 
propensity to engage in dialectical reasoning should enable the coopetive categorization 
of attempts to outperform. Therefore:      
H3a: The greater people’s propensities for dialectical reasoning, the more likely 
they are to categorize someone attempting to outperform others in a team as cooperative.    
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In Hypothesis 1, I asserted that people in China have more dialectical reasoning 
than people in the United States.  This is because dialectical reasoning is culturally 
conditioned and East Asian societies have more prevalent cultural artifacts emphasizing 
dialectical reasoning than Western societies. Because, as I just discussed, dialectical 
reasoning influences coopetive categorization, this suggests that coopetive categorization 
will also differ by natitonality.  People in China, compared to people in the United States, 
should be more likely to seek ways to integrate cooperation and competition, and thus be 
more likely to discover behaviors that they believe are both cooperative and competitive.  
Consequently: 
H3b: People in China are more likely than people in the US to categorize 
attempts to outperform as cooperative. 
H3c: The relationship between national culture (China and the US) and 
categorizing attempts to outperform as cooperative is mediated by dialectical reasoning. 
 
A complete theoretical model about the impact of national culture and dialectical 
reasoning on coopetitive categorization is presented in Figure 3. 
        
DIALECTICAL REASONING AND REACTIONS TO COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS 
Whether dialectical reasoning influences coopetive categorization has 
implications beyond an individual’s cognition. People use categories to guide their 
actions (Smith, 1989). In team interactions, people interpret others’ actions and then use 
their interpretations to choose their responses (Gibson, 2001).  Interpretations are 
particularly important for cooperation because the maintenance of cooperation within an 
interdependent team requires reciprocity (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Koster & Sanders, 2006). 
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People reciprocate based on their interpretations of the others’ actions, not the outcomes 
of those actions (Keysar, Converse, Wang, & Epley, 2008). Further, interpretations are 
categorical. Reciprocity implies responding not with exactly the same action but 
responding in kind (Gouldner, 1960), that is, with a response drawn from the same 
category. Thus, if team members interpret others’ actions as non-cooperative, they are 
likely to respond with a non-cooperative act (Andersson & Peerson, 1999; Glomb & 
Liao, 2003). Taken together, it follows that if people perceive an act with features 
resembling their category of cooperation, they will interpret the act as cooperative. 
Consequently, they are more likely to respond by cooperating.  
There are many types of behavior that people categorize as cooperation (Keller & 
Loewenstein, working paper). A particularly important kind of behavior that is often 
characterized as an indicator of cooperation within teams is knowledge sharing (Chatman 
et al., 2001; Gaertner, Pomare, Dovidio, Mann, & Murrell, 1990). Knowledge sharing 
occurs when a team member chooses to provide valuable information to other members 
of the team. Accordingly, if a team member observes one kind of cooperative behavior 
(e.g., team-focused effort), a team member can reciprocate by sharing knowledge. A team 
member can also refrain from knowledge sharing as a form of non-cooperative 
reciprocity in response to another behavior the person categorizes as non-cooperative 
(e.g., failing to compromise). Therefore, whether someone categorizes other members’ 
attempts to outperform as cooperative or non-cooperative should influence whether 
someone reciprocates by sharing knowledge. Team members who believe that another 
member’s attempt to outperform them is cooperative should reciprocate by sharing 
knowledge. Team members who believe that an attempt to outperform is non-cooperative 
will refrain from sharing knowledge. Therefore:   
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H4a: Team members who categorize attempts to outperform as more cooperative 
are more likely to respond to other team members’ attempt to outperform by behaving 
cooperatively (sharing knowledge).  
Dialectical reasoning should also have an impact on team members’ reactions to 
competitive behaviors. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, team members with a high 
propensity to engage in dialectical reasoning should be more likely to categorize others’ 
attempts to outperform as cooperative. Because categorization impacts team members’ 
behavioral reactions, the impact of dialectical reasoning on categorization should 
translate into an effect on behavioral team members’ behavioral reaction. Therefore, team 
members with a high propensity to engage in dialectical reasoning should be more likely 
perceive attempts to outperform as cooperative and consequently be likely to respond 
with a cooperative action. Therefore: 
H4b: The higher their propensities for dialectical reasoning, the more likely team 
members are to respond to another team member’s attempt to outperform by behaving 
cooperatively (sharing knowledge).  
H4c: The relationship between dialectical reasoning and cooperative behavior is 
mediated by coopetive categorization (the categorization of attempts to outperform as 
cooperative).  
 
The reciprocal behavioral reaction to an attempt to outperform by behaving 
cooperatively (or non-cooperatively) is not the only potential outcome of coopetive 
categorization.  Another potential outcome is the attribution that people make to the other 
team members’ behavior.  In particular, coopetive categorization may impact whether 
team members perceive other members’ intentions as cooperative (or non-cooperative). 
As one would expect, the intention to cooperate (or people’s motivation to work towards 
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group goals) is a predictor of people engaging in cooperative behavior (De Dreu, 
Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Critically, 
maintaining cooperative intentions are partially based on whether team members perceive 
others’ intentions to be cooperative (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996). Team 
members engage in ―mind-reading‖ of others’ intentions based on their observations of 
others’ behaviors (Ames, 2004; LePine & Van Dyne, 2001). For example, when a 
member does not perform well on a task deemed feasible to accomplish, others are likely 
to attribute the member’s lack of performance to a lack of motivation to work hard 
(Taggar & Neubert, 2004). Once a team member believes that another team member does 
not want to cooperate, the relationship between team members is difficult to restore 
(Johnson et al., 2006). Thus team members observe others’ behaviors not only to gauge 
how they will reciprocate in the short term, but also as an indicator of others’ intentions 
because these intentions are critical to maintaining group members’ motivations to 
continue cooperating. 
The ―mind reading‖ process requires using an interpretation of another’s behavior 
as an indication of their intentions. It is possible to believe that others are acting in a way 
that is perceived as non-cooperative (such as a lack of helping) without believing that the 
others do not want to cooperate.  Someone could theoretically attribute a perceived lack 
of cooperation to situational constraints or cultural differences in behavior.  However, in 
the absence of obvious cues that others are different, and because cooperation and 
competition are cultural categories that are highly likely to be taken-for-granted (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967) and treated as natural facts (Gelman, 2004), I suggest that people are 
unlikely to attribute others’ non-cooperative behavior to a difference in categorization. 
Instead, they are likely to believe failing to act cooperatively implies the person did not 
want to act cooperatively. Consequently, if team members categorize a behavior as 
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cooperative, they should perceive others’ who take the behavior to have cooperative 
intentions. But if they categorize a behavior as non-cooperative, they should perceive the 
others’ intentions as non-cooperative. Therefore: 
H5a: Team members who categorize attempts to outperform as more cooperative 
are more likely to respond to other team members’ attempts to outperform by perceiving 
the others’ intentions as cooperative.  
Because of the influence of dialectical reasoning on categorization, dialectical 
reasoning should also play an important role in people’s perceptions of others’ intentions. 
As Hypothesis 3 predicted, dialectical reasoning influences peoples’ propensity to 
categorize attempts to outperform as cooperative. Because the categorization of attempts 
to outperform as cooperative (or non-cooperative) will influence people’s perceptions of 
others’ intentions, dialectical reasoning should have a similar effect on the perception of 
others’ intentions as it does on knowledge sharing: 
  Therefore: 
H5b: The higher team members’ propensities for dialectical reasoning, the more 
likely they are to respond to another team member’s attempt to outperform by perceiving 
the others’ intentions as cooperative.  
H5c: The relationship between dialectical reasoning and the perception of others’ 
intentions is mediated by coopetive categorization (the categorization of attempts to 
outperform as cooperative).  
 
A complete theoretical model of the impact of dialectical reasoning and coopetive 
categorization on cooperative behavior and perceptions of intentions is displayed in 




In this study I predicted a set of hypotheses relating to national culture, dialectical 
reasoning, coopetive categorization and the reaction to competitive behaviors. First, I 
predicted that people in China would have higher dialectical reasoning than people in the 
US. Second, I predicted that team members, on average, would categorize the attempt to 
outperform others as more cooperative than the attempt to undermine others. Third, I 
predicted that dialectical reasoning would lead to more coopetive categorization and 
those in China will have more coopetive categorization, mediated by dialectical 
reasoning. Finally, I predicted that dialectical reasoning would lead to more knowledge 
sharing and a greater likelihood of perceiving others as cooperative, mediated by 
coopetive categorization.  
To empirically examine the hypotheses laid out, I conducted a two-part laboratory 
study with participants in both the US and China. The first part of the lab study enabled 
me to extensively measure dialectical reasoning, categorization of potentially cooperative 
and competitive behaviors, and various controls. The second part of the lab study enabled 
me to generate a team simulation task and to manipulate the exact behaviors to which 
participants observed and responded.  
PARTICIPANTS 
Overall, 194 participants participated in this study.2  Of the 194 participants, 94 
participants were undergraduate students from a large public university in the United 
States. The remaining 100 participants were undergraduate students from a large public 
university in the People’s Republic of China. In the United States, 62% of the participants 
                                                          
2 Data was collected from an additional 75 participants, but their data is not included in the results of this 
study because they engaged in tasks that were beyond the scope of this dissertation. Additional 
participants’ data was removed if they were not either native English-speakers or native Chinese-speakers. 
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were women. In China, 65% of the participants were women. In the United States, the 
average age of the participant was 20.3. In China, the average age of the participant was 
21.2. In the United States and China, participants were majors in multiple disciplines 
from throughout the University. Participation in the study was voluntary. In the United 
States, the participants received one point of extra credit in a Management course (each 
representing 1/100 of semester grade) for participating in each part of the study. In China, 
the participants received 30 yuan (app. 5 USD) for participating in each part of the study.  
STUDY DESIGN 
The study consisted of two parts, separated by 1-2 weeks. During the first part, 
measures for dialectical reasoning, coopetive categorization, demographic controls and 
psychographic controls were measured. During the second part, behavioral and 
perceptual reactions to attempts to outperform were measured. The second part of the 
study involved a 2 (US and China) x 2 (baseline and others attempting to outperform) 
between-subjects design. The hypothesized effects concerning behavioral and perceptual 
reactions were specific to attempts to outperform; the baseline condition provides the 
basis for showing that the simulation itself is not generating different patterns of 
behaviors and perceptions, but that it is specifically the presence of attempts to 
outperform that are generating differences. Thus the baseline condition only engaged in 
the second part of the study, and given the difficulty of cross-national data collection and 
the expectation of no differences of interest, fewer participants (25 participants per 
nation) were devoted to establishing the baseline patterns. 
TRANSLATION OF MATERIALS 
The materials included both original materials generated for the study and 
material from other sources. All original materials (including scale items and simulation 
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text) were initially developed in English, translated into simplified Chinese and back 
translated into English. The back-translated version was included in a pilot study, where 
no differences were found in results. Therefore, only the original English-language 
version of the study was included. For the Chinese-language version, the materials were 
translated by a Native-Chinese speaker and assessed for reliability by an additional 
Native Chinese speaker and a Native English speaker who is fluent in Chinese. When 
sourced materials were already available in Chinese (e.g., scale items for dialecticism), 
the sourced materials in Chinese were included. Otherwise, Chinese translations were 
generated using the same procedure as for the original materials. 
PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS IN PART 1 
Participants engaged in a series of questions presented on a computer. The details 
of the questions themselves are presented later, in the section on measures. The 
participants were first instructed to imagine themselves in a team of people working on a 
project.  They were then asked to rate a set of competitive behaviors used to measure 
participants’ categorizations of attempts to undermine and attempts to outperform. They 
were given a semantic association test, used as a control to measure whether they 
believed cooperation and competition were opposites. The participants were also asked 
questions measuring dialecticism and two control variables, independent self-construal 
and group-collective self-construal. All items from the three scales were combined and 
presented in a random order. Two filler tasks were presented between the three sections 
to reduce demand effects. The order of presentation of the three sets of materials was 
counterbalanced across participants, and no order effects were found. Demographic 
questions were presented at the end. 
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PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS IN PART 2 
Participation in the second part of the study occurred 1-2 weeks after Part 1. 
There were three activities in Part 2. The first was a brainstorming task, the second was a 
computer simulation and the third was a post-simulation questionnaire.  
Brainstorming Task. As discussed earlier, the categorization of attempts to 
outperform as cooperative is contingent on a team member believing that the act is 
beneficial for group gain. Therefore, in order for a team member to perceive an attempt to 
outperform as cooperative, they must think about the potential group benefit of an 
attempt to outperform. This requires that the team member believes that they are part of a 
team, which requires some amount of entitativity (Campbell, 1958), a perceived state of 
oneness with other members of a group. Because subsequent team-based interactions 
were simulated, the need for providing entitativity was particularly important for this 
task. Two activities were implemented to generate entitativity in all teams. First, 
participants were placed in team of three and asked to introduce themselves and discuss 
their academic and personal backgrounds. This established socialization, which has been 
found to influence entitativity (Moreland & McMinn, 1999). Immediately afterwards, the 
participants were asked to participate in a brainstorming task, as brainstorming has also 
been found to influence entitativity (Kramer, Kuo & Dailey, 1997). The brainstorming 
task was to list up to 12 activities that a new firm can do to successfully launch a new 
product.  They were given five minutes for this task. The brainstorming task is displayed 
in Appendix A. 
Computer Simulation. The next activity was a computer simulation of a sales 
team task. The goal of the computer simulation was to provide an interactive team setting 
in which attempts to outperform could be manipulated and reactions to the attempts to 
outperform could be measured.  To provide a controlled manipulation, I designed a 
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computer based exercise that simulated the actions of the other team members. The 
simulation was an original design because no preexisting design included simultaneous 
manipulations of cooperative and competitive behaviors within a team context. 
  The main task for the participants was to sell African teas. Each participant 
managed a stand with four kinds of tea. In the exercise, there were two other computer-
simulated team members, supposedly played by the two other people who participated in 
the brainstorming task.3  The responsibility of each team member was to order an optimal 
number of cups of tea each day for 25 days. Too many ordered cups would incur costs 
due to waste and too few ordered cups would incur costs due to reduced sales.  
At the beginning of the simulation, participants were placed at separate computer 
terminals. They were given seven minutes to read instructions. The instructions included 
a description of the overall task. The instructions indicated participants had mixed 
motives. The participants’ goal was to help the team perform well and to perform well 
individually.  The instructions are presented in Appendix B.  
After reading the instructions that explained the task, the participants were asked 
to send messages to the other team members. They then received messages from the other 
team members. In both the baseline and attempt to outperform conditions, the team 
members mentioned that they wanted the team do perform well. In the attempt to 
outperform condition, the computer-simulated team members also mentioned that they 
wanted to perform better than the other team members. The content for the messages 
were as follows for each team member: 
Team member A: ―I hope we all do well as a team.  I also hope that I am the best 
in the team.‖ 
                                                          
3 A manipulation check at the end of the study demonstrated that most participants believed that the team 
members were part of the same team as in the brainstorming task.  Data from the few participants that 
didn’t believe the team members were part of the same team were dropped from analysis. 
 28 
Team member B: ―I want us all to do well, but I plan on beating both of you.‖ 
The simulation exercise was a fixed time of 30 minutes for 25 rounds of decision 
making. Each day, one of the three team members received a message with information 
that would aid in optimizing sales and were given the option of forwarding the message 
to the other team members. The simulated team members forwarded every message to 
both team members. The participant had eight opportunities to forward messages to one 
or both team members. Each team member could also view a financial summary for all 
team members and the orders selected by all team members. In the attempt to outperform 
condition, the computer-simulated team members viewed the participant’s information 
(participant’s were given notice that their information was being viewed) frequently, and 
much more often than in the baseline condition. A screen shot of the simulation with an 
explanation for each item is presented in Appendix C.  
Post-simulation questionnaire. After the computer simulation, each participant 
completed a computer-based questionnaire about the simulation. The questionnaire 
included 16 questions about each of the other (simulated) team members, followed by 10 
questions about their own actions or experiences during the computer simulation. The 
order of questions within each set was randomized.   
MEASURES 
Categorization Variables 
In Part 1, each participant was asked three times to rate a list of 25 behaviors that 
a team member engaged in. These ratings were used to measure the categorization of 
attempts to outperform (4 behaviors) and attempts to undermine (4 behaviors).4  All 25 
                                                          
4 Four items referred to ―outhelping‖ behaviors (beyond the scope of this study). The remaining 13 items 
indicated a range of behaviors from Keller & Loewenstein (working paper). They were included as filler 
items to ensure that the participants had a basis of comparison for rating the target behaviors about attempts 
to outperform and attempts to undermine. 
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behaviors were presented together for each question and the order of the behaviors 
displayed were randomized within each question. The three questions were ―does this 
behavior indicate cooperation, non-cooperation or neither?‖, ―does this behavior indicate 
commitment to the group, non-commitment to the group, or neither‖, and ―does this 
behavior indicate competition, non-competition, or neither?‖  The items related to 
―commitment to the group‖ were used as a filler question to ensure that there were no 
demand effects over not being able to answer the same way for the same behavior for 
multiple questions. The order of the three questions was counterbalanced (with 
cooperation first and competition last, or the reverse), and no significant differences were 
found.  
Each participant was asked to rate each of the 25 behaviors on a five-point-scale. 
For each behavior, participants were asked if the item indicated (with x being instantiated 
by cooperation, competition or commitment to the team): 1 = ―a strong indicator of non-
x‖, 2 = ―a weak indicator of non-x‖, 3 = ‖neither an indicator of x or non-x‖, 4 = ―a weak 
indicator of x‖ or 5 = ―a strong indicator of x‖.  
  Categorization of Attempts to Outperform as Cooperation (Coopetive 
Categorization). Four items represented instances of a team member attempting to 
outperform others. They included: 1) ―A team member attempts to outperform other team 
members‖, 2) ―A team member gauges others' performance and makes sure that the he or 
she is doing better that the others‖, 3) ―A team member tries to get the quality of the his 
or her work to be better than the quality of others’ work‖, and 4) ―A team member tries to 
make sure that he or she isn't outdoing others in the team‖ (reverse-coded). These 
behaviors were consistently categorized as indicating competition (α=.81, M=4.06, 
SD=.55). The aggregation of participants’ responses about whether these attempts at 
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outperforming behaviors indicated cooperation was used to measure coopetive 
categorization (α=.73).  
Categorization of Attempts to Undermine as Cooperation. Four items 
represented instances of a team member attempting to undermine others. They included: 
1) ―A team member attempts to undermine other team members‖, 2) ―A team member 
tries to perform better by making sure other team members perform worse‖, 3) ―A team 
member request that another team member gets demoted in order for he or she to get 
promoted‖, 4) A team members makes sure that his or her gain is not at the expense of 
other team members’ loss‖ (reverse coded). An aggregation of the results from ratings 
about whether the items indicated cooperation on the five-point-scale was used to 
measure whether these attempts at undermining behaviors indicated cooperation (α=.77). 
Dependent Variables from the Simulation 
Cooperative Behavior. For cooperative behavior (knowledge sharing), I counted 
the number of times that the participant forwarded a message during the computer 
simulation. Each participant had eight opportunities. Therefore, the range is 0-8.  
Perception of Others’ Intention to Cooperate. To measure participants’ 
perceptions the other team members’ intentions, they were asked whether each of the 
other team members ―intended to cooperate‖. The two items (one for each simulated team 
member) were then aggregated (α=.82). 
Independent Variables 
Dialectical Reasoning. The measure for dialectical reasoning was the Dialectical 
Self Scale, developed by Spencer-Rodgers et al (2008) and used in Spencer-Rodgers et al 
(2009).  Both English and Chinese language scales were available from the authors and 
used as the measures. There were 36 items on a 7-point scale, covering the three areas of 
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tolerance for contradiction, cognitive change and behavioral change. All 36 items were 
aggregated (α=.74).   
National Culture. A dummy code of 1 was applied to all Native English 
speaking US citizens. A 0 was applied to all Native Chinese speaking Mainland Chinese 
citizens. 
Control Variables for Coopetive Categorization 
Semantic Association of Cooperation and Competition. An alternative 
explanation for a person categorizing attempts to outperform as cooperative is that they 
do not believe that cooperation and competition are opposites. Therefore, they are free to 
think about behaviors as both cooperative and competitive without concern for any 
antonymic relationship. To control for this possible explanation, each participant was 
given a semantic association test (Herman, 1999) during Part 1. Each participant was 
asked to rate the level of semantic association on a five-point scale for 36 word pairs as 
quickly as possible. Among the 36 pairs of words, one pair was ―cooperation‖ and 
―competition‖. Other pairs included 16 pairs of words that represented a range of 
synonymous, antonymous and unrelated words as measured by Herman (1979). An 
additional 19 business-related words were added for face validity, such as ―bull market‖ 
and ―bear market‖. An example of a synonym pair and an antonym pair were first 
presented, followed by the remaining 34 pairs in random order. The measure for semantic 
association of cooperation and competition was based on the participant’s score for this 
single item on a five-point scale.   
Independent Self Construal. An alternative explanation for a person not 
categorizing an attempt to outperform as cooperative is that the person has a strong view 
of the self as an individual (Markus & Kitayama). As a result, the person is sensitive to 
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the impact of any behavior that places the individual in a lower status than others. 
Therefore, they may believe that a competitive behavior can be cooperative, but they do 
not believe that an attempt to outperform is cooperative because they believe that a 
lowering of status indicates non-cooperation. Therefore, I also added the six-item, seven-
point-scale measure for independent self-construal (Singeles, 1994).  
Group-Collective Self Construal. An alternative explanation for a person 
categorizing an attempt to outperform as cooperative is that the person has a strong view 
of the self as part of a collective (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). As a result, the person is 
concerned about the impact of attempts to outperform on the group, and pays close 
attention to the group-level outcome. Therefore, I also added the six-item, seven-point-
scale measure for group-collective self-construal (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999).  
Demographic Variables. Age and Gender were also included as demographic 
variables that often influence behavior.5 
Control Variables for Reaction to Competitive Behaviors 
Perceived Difficulty of Task. An alternative explanation for a person not 
reacting to others’ behaviors in a cooperative way was that the person found the task to 
be difficult. As a result, participants might not have forwarded messages simply because, 
for example, they did not understand the task itself or because generating orders required 
their full attention so they failed to notice some of the messages. A single 7-point-scale 
item was included in the post-simulation questionnaire to denote whether the person had 
difficulty with the task.  The question was ―how difficult was the exercise today‖. 
                                                          
5 Data about English ability (for Chinese participants), international experience and work experience were 
also collected, but their relationship to the variables of interest is beyond the scope of this study. 
Additionally, native language was used as a screen (only native speakers were included in the sample).  
 33 
Manipulation of Attempts to Outperform 
The manipulation for attempts to outperform was applied to both computer-
generated confederates (―other team members‖). The manipulation of other team 
members’ attempts to outperform was conducted in three ways. First, when the 
participant received an initial message from each of the other team members after the 
participant sent an initial message, the messages signaled an attempt to outperform. For 
example, one team member said ―I hope we all do well. Of course, it would be nice if I 
did the best‖. Second, each team member had two reports (―yesterday’s results‖ and 
―cumulative results‖. Each team member could see whether other team members were 
looking at their reports. In the attempt to outperform condition, the other team members 
often looked at the participant’s report (they rarely did so in the baseline condition). 
Third, during the task, each team member would copy numbers from three out of the four 
orders of the most profitable team member. The fourth order would be changed to 
perform better than the top performer the previous day. In the baseline condition, the 





DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS AND CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS 
Means and Standard Deviations are presented separately for the US and China in 
Table 1. Similar to the results in previous studies on Dialectical Reasoning (e.g., 
Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2009), those in China had, on average, a higher propensity for 
dialectical reasoning compared to those in the US, thus supporting Hypothesis 1.  
For the comparison of competitive behaviors, overall, participants from both 
countries categorized attempts to outperform (M=3.21) as more cooperative than attempts 
to undermine (M=1.52), t(143)= 21.20, p<.001, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. There were 
no differences between attempts to outperform (M=4.06) and attempts to undermine 
(M=3.93) in their categorization as competitive, t(144)=1.29, ns.6 These results provide 
evidence that the categorization of attempts to outperform as cooperation can indicate 
coopetive categorization, and therefore the term ―coopetive categorization‖ will 
subsequently be applied to the categorization of attempts to outperform as cooperation. 
There were cross-national differences in the categorization of attempts to 
outperform as cooperative. Participants in China (MCH=3.70), on average, categorized 
attempts to outperform as more cooperative, compared to participants in the US 
(MUS=2.68), t(143) = 10.50, p<.001. In fact, in China, attempts to outperform were, on 
average, cooperative, t(143) = 12.96, p<.001, whereas in the US, attempts to outperform 
where, on average, non-cooperative, t(143)=-3.94, p<.001. 
The simulation showed that participants from China and the US reacted 
differently to attempts to outperform. The Chinese, relative to those in the US, were more 
likely to react by sharing knowledge (MCH=5.12, MUS=3.54, t(143) = 4.41, p<.001) and to 
                                                          
6 The contrasts between the two behaviors were significant in the US and China. I combined the samples 
for clarity in results. 
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perceive others’ as having the intention to cooperate (MCH=5.77, MUS=5.17, t(143) = 
3.34, p<.001). Thus the behavioral and perceptional reactions to attempts to outperform 
are consistent with the hypotheses. 
For control variables, there were no between-nation differences in semantic 
association (MCH=1.88, MUS=1.84, t(143) = 0.26, ns). In both the US and in China, 
cooperation and competition were, on average, antonymic (below 3 on the scale) (t(143) 
= 13.47, p<.001). Similar to the results in previous studies on self-construal, those in the 
US, on average, had a higher independent self-construal (MCH=4.49, MUS=5.31, t(143) = 
7.21, p<.001). Those in China, on average, had a higher group-collective self-construal 
(MCH=5.23, MUS=4.63, t(143) = 3.94, p<.001).  
First-order Pearson correlation coefficients for correlations between variables for 
the complete sample (US and China) are presented in Table 2.  
RESULTS FOR COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION 
A stepwise linear regression model was used to analyze the results for Hypotheses 
1 and 2, which predict the impact of dialectical reasoning and national culture (US/China) 
on coopetive categorization. Results from the regression are presented in Table 3. There 
are four models in the regression. The first includes only controls, the second includes 
dialecticism, the third includes national culture and the fourth includes both dialecticism 
and national culture. Dialecticism predicted coopetive categorization, supporting 
Hypothesis 3a. National Culture also predicted coopetive categorization, supporting 





To test for Hypothesis 3c, the mediation effects of dialectical reasoning, I ran a 
bootstrapped test of an indirect effect of national culture on coopetive categorization 
through dialectical reasoning (Preacher & Hayes, 2005).  The mean indirect effect was 
0.12 (95% CI: 0.01-0.22), p<.05, providing evidence of mediation and therefore 
supporting Hypothesis 3c. Therefore, national cultural differences in whether people 
categorize attempts to outperform as an indicator of cooperation are attributed to 
differences in dialectical reasoning. Moreover, as the model with both dialectical 
reasoning and national culture in Table 3 demonstrate, dialectical reasoning predicted 
coopetive categorization, even when controlling for national culture. Therefore, people’s 
general propensity to engage in dialectical reasoning also explains variance within each 
national culture. 
RESULTS FOR REACTIONS TO COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS 
Manipulation Effects 
To check whether there were any effects of the manipulation of attempts to 
outperform, each participant rated the extent to which each of the other team members 
attempted to outperform other team members. I aggregated the two items (α=.72). The 
participants who received the manipulation (and whose results are represented in this 
study) rated the extent to which others were attempting to outperform much higher than 
the sample of 50 in a baseline condition (Moutperform = 5.45, SD= 1.15 Mbaseline.= 2.83, 
SD=1.35, t(199)= 13.26, p<.001).  
The impact of the manipulation on knowledge sharing differed by national 
culture, reflecting differences between the two national cultures in coopetive 
categorization. For the sample in China, there were no differences in knowledge sharing 
between the baseline and manipulated conditions (Moutperform = 5.12, SD= 2.28 Mbaseline.= 
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4.95, SD=1.85, t(99)= 0.16, ns). There was no evidence that the presence of attempts to 
outperform lowered Chinese participants’ knowledge sharing relative to the absence of 
attempts to outperform. For the sample in the US, there was a significant drop in 
knowledge sharing in the manipulated condition compared to the baseline condition 
(Moutperform = 3.54, SD= 2.03 Mbaseline.= 4.95, SD=1.68, t(93)= 3.10, p=<.001). Thus the 
US participants were notably less likely to share knowledge specifically when team 
members attempted to outperform. The baseline rate of US participants’ knowledge 
sharing was no different than the Chinese participants’ baseline rate; so the difference in 
knowledge sharing the attempts to outperform condition is not attributable to a general 
difference in willingness to share knowledge by nationality, but is specific to reacting to 
attempts to outperform. 
Results for Hypotheses 
Before testing the hypotheses regarding knowledge sharing and perceptions of 
cooperative intentions, I tested whether there were any significant effects of 
brainstorming team membership on these variables and found no significant results. For 
simplicity of presentation of results, I collapsed all team-level results and chose to use a 
stepwise linear regression model instead of a hierarchical linear regression model with 
team affiliation included. The stepwise linear regression model results are displayed in 
Table 4 for cooperative behavior. The first model is the base (only control variables), the 
second includes coopetive categorization, the third includes dialectical reasoning and the 
fourth includes both dialectical reasoning and coopetive categorization. To control for 
heterogeneity attributed to unobserved national cultural differences, national culture was 
included as a control variable. Because of difficulty in the task potentially influencing 
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how a participant is able to forward messages (and thus share knowledge), I controlled 
for that variable as well. 
The regression found that coopetive categorization predicted knowledge sharing, 
thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. Dialectical reasoning also predicted knowledge sharing, 
thus supporting Hypothesis 4b. Finally, I ran a bootstrapped test of an indirect effect of 
dialectical reasoning on knowledge sharing through coopetive categorization (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2005).  The mean indirect effect was 0.13 (95% CI: 0.02-0.35), p<.05, providing 
evidence of mediation and supporting Hypothesis 4c. Therefore, dialectical reasoning 
enables team members to maintain knowledge sharing when others attempt to outperform 
to outperform by facilitating the categorization of attempts to outperform as cooperative. 
I used a similar analysis for the results of perceived intention to cooperate to test 
hypotheses 5a and 5b. I used the same base variables and the same independent variables, 
but with perceived intention to cooperate as the dependent variable. Results from the 
regression analysis are displayed in Table 5.  
The results from the regression analysis found that coopetive categorization did 
predict perceived intention to cooperate, supporting Hypothesis 5a. Dialectical reasoning 
also predicted perceived intention to cooperate, supporting Hypothesis 5b. Finally, I ran a 
bootstrapped test of an indirect effect of dialectical reasoning on perceived intention to 
cooperate through coopetive categorization (Preacher et al., 2005).  The mean indirect 
effect was 0.08 (95% CI: 0.01-0.20), p<.05, providing evidence of mediation and 
supporting Hypothesis 5c. Therefore, dialectical reasoning prevents team members from 
thinking that others’ intentions were not to cooperate when they attempt to outperform 
them. It likely does so in part by leading people to believe that attempting to outperform 




The main purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between 
dialectical reasoning, national culture, coopetive categorization and the behavioral and 
perceptual reactions to competitive behaviors within a team. I confirmed cross-national 
differences in dialectical reasoning. I identified a type of competitive behavior that could 
potentially be categorized as both cooperative and competitive, attempts to outperform 
other team members, and contrasted its categorization with another behavior, attempts to 
undermine. I then assessed whether there were national cultural differences in whether 
people categorized attempts to outperform as both cooperative and competitive, and 
whether these differences were attributed to differences in dialectical reasoning. I then 
assessed whether dialectical reasoning, through its influence on categorization, impacted 
people’s reactions to others’ attempts to outperform. I examined two reactions; 
knowledge sharing and perceptions of others’ intentions to cooperate.  
The results of the study provided empirical evidence that dialectical reasoning, a 
culturally-influenced reasoning style, influenced coopetive categorization, and this 
influenced people’s reactions to competitive behaviors within the team. People with high 
levels of dialecticism, particularly those in China, were more likely to categorize a team 
member’s attempts to outperform as an indicator of cooperation. Moreover, when others 
attempted to outperform them, they were more likely to continue to share knowledge with 
them and perceive them as wanting to cooperate with them. Therefore, the results suggest 
that there is an underlying culturally-influenced reasoning about opposites that influences 
how team members think about the relationship between cooperation and competition 
and how team members behave when confronting a simultaneous instance of cooperation 
and competition.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Implications for Research on Cooperation and Competition in Teams 
The results of the study have immediate implications for research on cooperation 
and competition within teams. It is well established that cooperation within teams can 
facilitate team processes and generate effective team outcomes. For example, cooperation 
includes the behaviors of knowledge sharing and helping, two behaviors that are integral 
for team outcomes (Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993; Flynn, 2006). It is less well 
established but also supported that competition within teams can increase individual 
effort towards team goals, and thereby also generate effective team outcomes (Fletcher, 
Major, & Davis, 2008). Consequently, many teams involve mixed motives (e.g., 
Komorita & Parks, 1995). The results from this study suggest that people with higher 
dialectical reasoning are more likely to maintain cooperation when others compete. They 
are less likely to treat cooperation and competition as ―trade-offs‖. Therefore, people with 
higher dialectical reasoning may be more suitable as members of mixed motive teams. As 
a result, teams with mixed motives and members with higher overall propensities for 
dialectical reasoning should perform better than teams whose members have a mixture of 
propensities for dialectical reasoning (because of the potential for misunderstandings and 
conflict) as well as teams whose members have a low propensity for dialectical reasoning 
(because this should force tradeoffs). The relationship between team incentives, 
composition of dialectical reasoning styles and team performance is an exciting area for 
future research.  
The national cultural differences in dialectical reasoning have particular 
implications for research on the role of culture in cooperation and competition within 
teams. Previous literature has looked into the relationship between national culture and 
cooperation, focusing on differences in individualist vs. collectivist values. Some have 
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attributed more cooperation to collectivism (Eby & Dobbins, 1997; Kirkman & Shapiro, 
2001; Wagner, 1995). Others have attributed more cooperation to individualism 
(Yamagishi, 1988a). And still others have proposed moderating factors such as identity 
(Chen et al. 1998) and the type of sanctioning system (Chen & Li, 2005; Yamagishi, 
1988b). The results from this study suggest that we think about the relationship between 
national culture, cooperation and competition differently. As the results suggest, people 
in China are less likely to react to competitive behaviors by reducing their level of 
cooperation. These effects were not a result of a general propensity to cooperate, as there 
were no differences between the national cultures in their general propensity to 
cooperate. Instead, differences in cooperation were associated with differences in 
dialectical reasoning. Therefore, cultural differences may not be limited to differences in 
cultural values, but in the reasoning about seemingly opposite values. Future research on 
the relationship between national culture and cooperation should therefore incorporate 
reasoning style. 
Implications for Research on Diversity in Teams 
The results that revealed systematic differences in the perceived intention to 
cooperate have particular implications for research on diversity in teams. Previous 
literature on diversity on teams has pointed to a distinction between surface-level and 
deep-level diversity (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 
2002). Deep-level diversity is unobservable, whereas surface-level is observable (e.g., 
age, race, gender). First, the results of the study indicate that dialectical reasoning 
influences how people react to competitive behaviors. Future research can address 
whether dialectical reasoning also influences whether people engage in competitive 
behaviors. If people with high dialectical reasoning are more likely to believe that a 
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competitive behavior can also be cooperative, they may be more likely to engage in 
competitive behaviors, as they aren’t constrained by the belief that it hampers 
cooperation. However, as the results indicate, people with low dialectical reasoning are 
likely to respond by lowering cooperation. Future research can examine whether teams 
with higher diversity in dialectical reasoning (both high and low members) cooperate less 
than teams with lower diversity in dialectical reasoning (only high or only low members.  
 Second, people make attributions about deep-level differences within the team 
based on stereotypes associated with surface-level diversity (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
The stereotyping often leads to relational conflict among team members (Mohammed & 
Angell, 2004; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). The identification of a difference in the 
categorization of competitive behaviors in this study presents a potential form of deep-
level diversity within teams, as people do not only interpret competitive behaviors 
differently, but also react to competitive behaviors differently. The systematic differences 
in categorization attributed to national culture suggest that potential deep-level diversity 
in coopetive categorization may be correlated with surface-level diversity association 
with nationality.  
Moreover, the results also found that people who categorize attempts to 
outperform as non-cooperative are also more likely to believe that those performing the 
act have non-cooperative intentions. Given the influence of stereotyping on attributions to 
behavior in teams, there is also a potential for people to make further attributions of non-
cooperativeness to nationality. This can have implications for cross-national teams. If 
people from China are more likely to engage in coopetive behavior in teams because they 
engage in coopetive categorization, people from the US who do not share that 
categorization may associate non-cooperativeness with nationality, thus creating national-
based fault lines in cross-national teams (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Lau & 
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Murnighan, 2005). Future research can address this issue by exploring the impact of 
coopetive categorization and cross-national diversity on stereotyping, relational conflict 
and fault line formation.        
Implications for Research on Culture in Teams 
The results also have broader implications for the study of culture in teams. The 
systematic cross-national effects associated with dialecticism suggests that there is an 
exogenously developed reasoning style that impacts how people think and behave within 
teams. People acquired a basic approach to reasoning about opposites outside of the team 
context, and this impacted how people behaved within a team context. This provides a 
new approach to looking at how national culture impacts behavior in teams, by exploring 
basic reasoning styles associated with opposites. Future research can explore additional 
areas within teams that involve similar reasoning style variance, such as team member 
categorizations of superior-subordinate and peer relationships or task and non-task 
relationships.  
But the extent to which any exogenous effect overrides endogenous factors is an 
empirical question that requires further inquiry. Future research can assess whether there 
are any endogenous factors that may moderate the effects of dialecticism on behavior 
within teams. For example, team reflexivity associated with interpretations of competitive 
behaviors may reduce the effect of team member’s categorization of competitive 
behaviors on their reactions to competitive behaviors at the time of occurrence (Gurtner, 
Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007; Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007). 
Individuals within the team may have greater cultural intelligence (Earley et al., 2003; 
Janssens & Brett, 2006), an understanding of differences in cultures and the motivation to 
change behavior accordingly.  People with higher cultural intelligence may assess 
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whether their interpretations are attributed to cultural differences in understanding before 
reacting to others’ behaviors. 
LIMITATIONS 
Some limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of the study. 
First, the study was conducted within the laboratory, and therefore was not able to 
include influences of managers, organizational culture, and other environmental factors 
that may influence how individuals behave within a team. A laboratory setting was a 
more appropriate setting to control the task environment and to measure immediate 
participant reactions and perceptions. Future research can address this limitation by 
exploring the role of dialectical reasoning and coopetive categorization in a natural team 
setting, including an examination of organizational or managerial influences.  
Second, the behaviors that other team members engaged in were simulated by a 
computer. The purpose of a laboratory setting with simulated team members was to 
provide a controlled manipulation of particular behaviors and to measure reactions 
accordingly. This control was necessary to measure direct reactions and perceptions. 
Future research can address this limitation by exploring natural team interactions and 
measuring attempts to outperform instead of manipulating the behavior. 
Third, the study did not include variance in individual-based or team-based 
incentives for cooperation. Future research can explore the moderating effects of 
incentives to determine the robustness of the impact of categorization when the 
participants have varying levels of incentives themselves. The study also did not measure 
variance in individual dispositions for cooperating and competing. Future research can 
address potential interaction effects between people’s categorization of cooperation and 
their cooperative and competitive value orientations.  
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Finally, national cultural differences were limited to a cross-national comparison 
of the US and China. Future research can explore additional national cultures that may 
vary in their amounts of dialectical reasoning or related forms of culturally-influenced 
metacognition. Additional future research can explore other forms of cultural influence, 
such as organizational or professional culture.  
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, how team members think about other team members’ actions and 
the consequences of those thoughts may be influenced by basic reasoning styles that are 
acquired through cultural experience exogenous to the immediate team context. In this 
study, I found that one culturally-influenced reasoning style in particular, dialectical 
reasoning, influenced how people categorize competitive behaviors, how they react to 
competitive behaviors and how they perceived others acting competitively. This study 
therefore demonstrates that team cognition research can be expanded to encompass an 
understanding of the environmental factors that influence basic metacognitive processes. 
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STUDY 2: CULTURE, COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION AND 
COOPETITION IN WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 
Introduction 
In organizations, people compete with each other over resource allocations, 
promotions, and other valuable outcomes and at the same time they also cooperate with 
each other in committees, task forces, and teams to coordinate the production of work. 
The necessity for people to both compete and cooperate poses challenges that are 
particularly acute in knowledge-based organizations (Grant, 1996). The term 
"coopetition" was coined to capture the simultaneously cooperative and competitive 
behavior required in many contemporary organizations (Tsai, 2002). 
Recent research has found that coopetition – the co-occurrence of competition and 
cooperation -- can help performance in organizations (Luo, Slotegraaf, & Pan, 2006). But 
research on organizations has traditionally treated cooperation and competition as two 
opposing categories, such as in the contrast between a cooperative or competitive 
relationship (Deutsch, 1949; Tjosvold, 1984), the contrast between a cooperative or 
competitive choice (Komorita & Parks, 1996), and the contrast between a cooperative 
(cohesive) or competitive (structurally equivalent) position within a social network (Burt, 
1987; Kilduff & Oh, 2006). The conceptualization of cooperation and competition as 
opposites is pervasive, including in discussions of organizational relationships, inter-firm 
relations (e.g., Lado, Boyd & Hanlon, 1996), and international affairs (e.g., Esty, 1998).  
To the extent that a social convention that treats cooperation and competition as 
opposites permeates people's own experiences within organizations, a major stumbling 
block to the emergence of coopetive working relationships is likely to be deeply 
ingrained habits of thinking about competitive and cooperative behaviors as opposites. 
This ingrained differentiation of competition and cooperation may be particularly 
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characteristic of people in Western societies (cf. Fruin, 1992). Western cultural traditions 
emphasize making distinctions between seemingly opposite phenomena, whereas Eastern 
cultural traditions emphasize integrating seemingly opposite phenomena (Chen, 2008; 
Norenzayan et al., 2002; Peng et al., 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). Therefore, in 
this paper, I examine whether people’s propensity to categorize competitive behaviors as 
non-cooperative relates to people’s networks of working relationships. I also examine 
whether systematic differences in categorization and associated effects on working 
relationships can be attributed to national cultural differences.  
This study aims to contribute to our understanding of cognition and culture in 
network relationships.  First, I address a gap in our understanding of the role of cognition 
in network relationships. Previous literature on cognition in social networks has tended to 
focus on peoples’ perceptions of their network (see Borgatti & Foster, 2003 for a review).  
For example, Kumbasar, Romney & Batchelder (1994) found cognitive biases in people’s 
perceptions of how central they are in their network.  Other research has looked at the 
cognitive mechanisms that people use to understand the structural features of the 
networks they are embedded in (e.g., Janicik & Larrick, 2005) Less attention has been 
made on the impact of people’s categorization of relational behaviors on the content of 
network ties. I address this gap by focusing on how the people’s categorization of 
competitive behaviors might affect the relationship between cooperation and competition 
in their network of working relationships.  Second, I address a gap in our understanding 
of the role of national culture in networks of working relationships.  Most previous 
literature on the role of national culture in networks has focused on people’s propensity to 
engage in informal networks, such as research on guanxi networks in China (e.g., Park & 
Luo, 2001). I address this gap by examining how national culture may influence network 
relationships through the culture’s influence on categorization. 
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COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION 
At the center of my theorizing is that people use categories to guide their 
perception and behavior. Categories are knowledge structures that group sets of referents, 
usually because they are similar in some way (e.g., share a common appearance, function, 
or underlying essence; Murphy, 2002). Categories provide a critical source of cognitive 
economizing, enabling people to decrease the amount of information required for making 
a decision by connecting past experiences to present situations and providing inferences 
to direct action (Smith, 1989). Brought to the context of working relationships, 
categorization is important because an overall categorization of a working relationship 
facilitates understanding and reacting to complex series of behaviors (Wageman, 1995). 
Each instance of behavior within a relationship provides an occasion for people to 
interpret and make choices about how to behave, including how to demonstrate their 
intentions towards the other. People’s perceptions of their relationships are based in part 
on their initial motivations, and also incorporate their interpretations of the ensuing 
behaviors occurring over the course of their relationships. I view ―cooperation‖ and 
―competition‖ as important categories that people use to interpret behaviors, guide 
responses, and shape inferences about their overall working relationships.  
Treating cooperation and competition as categories allows for variation in 
whether a particular behavior could be a member of both, one or neither categories. This 
view is related to Jackson and Dutton’s (1988) study of the relationship between threats 
and opportunities. They found that managers can categorize environmental issues as both 
threats and opportunities, exclusively as threats, exclusively as opportunities, or neither 
as threats nor as opportunities. Similarly, if people in a working relationship have two 
distinct, orthogonal categories of ―cooperation‖ and ―competition‖, they have the 
potential to categorize the other person’s behavior as cooperative and competitive (i.e., 
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coopetive), exclusively cooperative, exclusively competitive or neither cooperative nor 
competitive. I define a propensity to categorize others’ behaviors as both cooperative and 
competitive as coopetive categorization. People who categorize others’ behaviors as both 
cooperative and competitive are high in coopetive categorization, whereas people who 
categorize all competitive behaviors as non-cooperative (and vice-versa) are low in 
coopetive categorization. 
The range of potential behaviors that could indicate cooperation is immense—
including any pro-social behavior that benefits the collective (i.e., the organization) or 
limits harm to the collective (Argyle, 1991; Tyler, 2002). For example, behaviors that can 
indicate cooperation include helping, sharing, communicating, and exerting effort, each 
of which can itself manifest in innumerable ways. Competition also applies to a wide 
range of situations and behaviors concerned with relative positioning for advancing status 
or material gain (Johnson et al, 1989).  
Using the core features of cooperation and competition just discussed, I propose 
two kinds of competitive behaviors, attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine, 
that are intended to differ in how readily they could be categorized as cooperation and as 
competition. I define attempts to outperform as behaviors that are intended to promote an 
organizational member’s standing through increasing their own performance. For 
example, an employee may try to finish a project faster than others to stake a claim that 
he or she is the hardest worker in the entire company. I suggest this is a type of 
competitive behavior because it has a core feature a concern for relative standing. I also 
suggest this type of behavior could be perceived as cooperative because such actions 
need not cause harm to other colleagues or to the organization as a whole—they should in 
fact be able to help the organization’s performance.   
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In contrast, I define attempts to undermine as behaviors taken to increase some 
organizational members’ relative standing by harming the performance of other 
colleagues. For example, a colleague might attempt to undermine others by providing 
them with false information that if used would lead them to take poor actions. This 
behavior seems likely to hurt the organization overall, especially given that other 
colleagues are likely to respond to the attempt to undermine by engaging in even more 
harmful acts, creating a tit-for-tat downward spiral (Andersson et al., 1999; Glomb et al., 
2003). Therefore, attempts to undermine are likely to be perceived as competitive, and 
because they should also be harmful to the organization as a whole, they should not be 
perceived as cooperative.  
The distinction between attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine is 
related to a prior distinction in the social interdependence literature that also distinguishes 
between more and less harmful forms of competition (Stanne et al., 1999). That 
distinction is between zero-sum and appropriate competition. Zero-sum competition is 
defined as situations in which one team member wins and all others lose. Appropriate 
competition is defined as competition subject to the following stringent limitations: 
winning is relatively unimportant, all members have an equal chance to win, there are 
clear rules, and members can monitor each others’ performance (see also Tjosvold et al., 
2003). The distinction I draw between attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine 
places many fewer restrictions on relevant situations, and so are relevant to a greater 
array of outcomes. Attempts to undermine are somewhat like zero-sum competition, 
except that it is possible for attempts to undermine lead to lose-lose outcomes, not just 
win-lose outcomes. Attempts to outperform are somewhat like appropriate competition in 
emphasizing the possibility for collective gains, but it only requires the monitoring 
assumption. Thus I rely on attempts to outperform and attempts to undermine as types of 
 51 
competition because they apply more broadly than zero-sum and appropriate competition, 
and because they better fit a category-based approach. 
COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION AND WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 
In addition to categorizing behaviors, people also categorize their relationships 
with others (Baldwin, 1992), including their working relationships with others in 
organizations (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). There are many ways to 
categorize working relationships, but because of the ubiquity of cooperation and 
competition in organizational relationships (Deutsch, 1949; 1973), ―cooperation‖ and 
―competition‖ are categories that are likely to be used as categories for working 
relationships.  
When categorizing people’s relationships, people make inferences based on 
others’ behaviors (Ames, 2004). If a person perceives another person’s behavior as 
cooperative, they are likely to believe that the person wants to cooperate. When the 
working relationship involves interdependence (Thompson 1967; Wageman, 1995), 
people also reciprocate the behaviors they perceive (Fehr & Gintis, 2007). If a person 
perceives another person’s act as cooperative, then the person more likely reciprocates by 
cooperating (Koster & Sanders 2006). But if a person perceives another person’s act as 
non-cooperative, then the person more likely reciprocates by engaging in non-cooperative 
behavior (Andersson & Peerson, 1999; Glomb & Liao, 2003). Because working 
relationships are dynamic (Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997)), a series of behaviors manifest 
into an overall pattern of a behaviors within a relationship. Therefore, how people 
perceive others’ behaviors will influence people’s perception of their overall relationship.  
Inferences about behaviors depend on how people categorize the behavior (Smith, 
1989). An attempt to outperform is a common behavior in organizational relationships, as 
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status seeking is a natural occurrence within organizations (Washington & Zajac, 2005) 
Therefore, people within organizations will likely be in multiple situations where they 
will try to outperform others or will encounter others’ attempts to outperform. 
Consequently, they will encounter many opportunities to categorize attempts to 
outperform and make inferences based on the categorization.  
The influence of categorization of behaviors on the perception of working 
relationships suggests that coopetive categorization will influence whether a person 
would perceive the same working relationship as both cooperative and competitive. 
Because an attempt to outperform indicates an attempt to gain a relatively higher 
position, the behavior exhibits features that are likely to be interpreted as competitive 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1999). Because of attributions associated with behaviors (Ames, 
2004), people should therefore consistently perceive a relationship that involves attempts 
to outperform as competitive. But only if the person also categorizes attempts to 
outperform as cooperative should the person perceive a relationship that involves 
attempts to outperform as cooperative. I define this type of relationship as perceptually 
coopetitive.  
Categories do not only influence people’s perceptions, but also guide their actions 
(Murphy, 2002). If people are categorizing behaviors as cooperative, they are then more 
likely to reciprocate by also engaging in behaviors that they believe are cooperative 
(Koster and Sanders, 2006). There are many types of behavior that people categorize as 
cooperation (Keller & Loewenstein, working paper). A particularly important kind of 
behavior that is often characterized as a behavioral manifestation of cooperation and is 
valued within organizations (Kogut & Zander, 1992) is knowledge sharing (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003). Knowledge sharing within a working relationship occurs when a person 
provides valuable information to another person within a working relationship. Because a 
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person can categorize different types of behavior as cooperative, a person is not limited to 
reciprocating with the same behavior. Instead, when a person observes a different kind of 
cooperative behavior, a person can reciprocate through knowledge sharing. A person can 
also refrain from knowledge sharing as a form of non-cooperative reciprocity in response 
to another behavior the person categorizes as non-cooperative. Therefore, whether 
someone categorizes other members’ attempts to outperform as cooperative or non-
cooperative will influence whether someone shares knowledge. People who believe that 
an attempt to outperform them is cooperative will reciprocate by sharing knowledge. 
People who believe that an attempt to outperform is non-cooperative will refrain from 
sharing knowledge. 
Coopetive categorization should have an impact on how often people share 
knowledge with the people they perceive as competitive. If a person believes that an 
attempt to outperform is cooperative, then the person is more likely to respond to 
behaviors the person perceives as competitive by sharing more knowledge. However, if a 
person believes that an attempt to outperform is non-cooperative, then the person is more 
likely to respond to behaviors the person perceives as competitive by sharing less 
knowledge. This will impact how often the person shares knowledge throughout the 
entire working relationship. I define this type of relationship as behaviorally coopetitive.       
COOPETIVE CATEGORIZATION AND EGO-CENTRIC NETWORKS 
Thus far the discussion has focused on a single relationship, but people within 
organizations are embedded in a network of numerous working relationships 
(Grannoveter, 1985). If people’s perceptions of their working relationships are based on 
widely used categories of cooperation and competition, as we have been discussing, then 
the effects of those categories should apply generally to their working relationships. That 
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is, people’s understandings of the relationship between cooperation and competition—
and specifically whether they are willing to categorize attempts to outperform as both 
cooperation and competition—should guide their willingness to consider not just one 
relationship but many working relationships as being both cooperative and competitive.  
A useful way to specify the question of whether people perceive a series of 
working relationships as both cooperative and competitive is to conceptualize people’s 
working relationships as sets of ego-centric networks with different kinds of ties. An ego-
centric network is the set of social relations between a focal actor and all the other 
people, or alters, with whom they hold a particular kind of social relation, or tie (Burt, 
1980). For example, people have friendship ties and advice ties, and therefore they have a 
friendship ego-centric network, which represents all of an individual’s friendship ties, 
and an advice ego-centric network, which represent all of an individual’s advice ties. 
Different kinds of social ties may overlap, such that an individual can have a friendship 
tie with the same person with whom they have an advice tie. Then, as a means of 
aggregating across someone’s entire ego-centric networks, it is possible to generate a 
correlation to characterize the degree of overlap between two ego-centric networks of 
different tie types (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Thus as a means for exploring people’s 
general willingness to characterize their working relationships as both cooperative and 
competitive, we can ask whether people’s ego-centric cooperation network is correlated 
with their ego-centric competition network. In a coopetive ego-centric network, a tie that 
is relatively more cooperative is also relatively more competitive and a tie that is 
relatively less competitive is relatively less cooperative. But in a non-coopetive ego-
centric network, a tie that is more cooperative is relatively less competitive and a tie that 
is relatively less cooperative is relatively more competitive.  
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Accordingly, a basis for assessing people’s overall propensity to perceive their 
relationships as both cooperative and competitive is by assessing the overall pattern of 
their perceived cooperative and competitive ties in the form of a correlation of the two 
networks of perceived ties. Therefore, I define an ego-centric network with a positive 
correlation between perceived cooperative and competitive ties as a perceptually 
coopetive ego-centric network.  Moreover, a basis for assessing people’s overall 
propensity to share knowledge with people they perceive as competitive is by assessing 
the overall pattern of knowledge sharing and competitive ties in the form of a correlation 
of knowledge sharing and competitive ties. Therefore, I define an ego-centric network 
with a positive correlation between knowledge sharing and competitive ties as a 
behaviorally coopetitive ego-centric network. For a more behaviorally coopetive ego-
centric network, relatively more competitive working relationships have relatively more 
knowledge sharing.  For a less behaviorally coopetive ego-centric network, relatively 
more competitive working relationships have relatively less knowledge sharing.   
Therefore, as discussed above, if more coopetive categorization leads people to 
more likely assess more competitive relationships as also more cooperative, then higher 
coopetitive categorization should lead to a more perceptually coopetitive ego-centric 
network.  Because coopetitive categorization should also lead people to share knowledge 
with their perceived competitors, higher coopetitive categorization should also lead to a 
more behaviorally coopetitive ego-centric network. Therefore: 
 
H1a: People who categorize attempts to outperform as an indication of 
cooperation will have a behaviorally more coopetive ego-centric network. 
H1b: People who categorize attempts to outperform as an indication of 
cooperation will have a behaviorally more coopetive ego-centric network. 
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NATIONAL CULTURE AND COOPETIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 
In understanding the impact of coopetive categorization on the formation of 
coopetive working relationships, it is also important to examine the potential antecedents 
of coopetive categorization. As discussed earlier, the exclusive categorization of 
behaviors as distinct opposites is a product of social convention. Another way to 
conceptualize the impact of social conventions is to treat the categories of cooperation 
and competition as cultural categories (Atran et al., 2005; Sperber & Hirschfield, 2004), 
developed within each cultural group.  
Not all national cultures reason about opposites the same way. One particular 
form of reasoning about opposites that is shaped by culture is dialectical reasoning (Peng 
et al, 1999; Peng, Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2006; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2004). 
Dialectical reasoning stems from two lay ontological theories that indicate people’s own 
theories about knowledge (Hong et al, 2001). A lay theory of contradiction holds that two 
ostensibly contradictory concepts may both be true (Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2009). An 
associated lay theory of change asserts that the universe is unpredictable and dynamic, 
therefore what may be the same at one point of time may be different at another point of 
time (and vice-versa) (Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2009). 
  People acquire dialectical reasoning from external cultural artifacts such as 
stories and proverbs (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Dialectical reasoning appears in some 
modern Western philosophy (Walton, 1990). It is a subject addressed by Hegel 
(Gadamer, 1982), Marx (Lukacs & Livingstone, 1972) and Habermas (Ingram, 1989). 
But it has not had a major impact on general lay beliefs in Western culture (Samson, 
2004). In contrast, dialectical reasoning is most prevalent in Chinese culture (Peng et al, 
2006). Its meaning is exemplified in the 阴阳(Yin-Yang) symbol found in the classic text 
易经 (Yi Jing, Book of Changes; Willhelm & Baynes, 1961), demonstrating that black and 
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white are part of one whole. The integration of opposites is a prominent feature in Laozi’s 
道德经 (Dao De Jing; Lao, 1982), and is associated with wisdom. The virtue of finding a 
―middle way‖ between two extremes is also found in Confucius’ 中庸 (Zhong Yong, 
Doctrine of the Mean; Confucius, 2004). In China (as well as in Japan, Korea and 
Vietnam), these texts have long been canonized (Schwartz, 1985), and dialectical 
reasoning has long permeated stories, proverbs and other commonplace cultural artifacts 
within China (Peng et al, 1999). Because greater access to cultural artifacts make 
knowledge structures more culturally accessible (Hong et al, 2004), people in China more 
familiar with dialectical reasoning (Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2006; 2009). As a result, 
people in China are more likely to have a general disposition towards dialectical 
reasoning that applies to multiple contexts (Spencer-Rodgers et al; 2006; 2009). 
Dialectical reasoning may overcome the negative effects of social convention on 
coopetive categorization. Dialectical reasoning influences people’s general beliefs about 
contradiction and change, which make people less hindered by their perception of two 
categories as opposites. Therefore, if a person has a high amount of dialectical reasoning, 
the person is more likely to tolerate the idea that a behavior can be both cooperative and 
competitive, even if the idea is counter-intuitive to the premise that cooperation and 
competition are opposites. The person is also more likely to think about the relationship 
between cooperation and competition based on the current situation and not based on a 
standard rule. Consequently, the person is more likely to discover a behavior that they 
believe is both cooperative and competitive. Although an attempt to outperform others is 
not the only behavior that could potentially be categorized as both cooperative and 
competitive, as mentioned earlier, the behavior exhibits features that represent both 
cooperation and competition. Higher dialectical reasoning should therefore enable the 
coopetive categorization associated with attempts to outperform, in particular. Therefore, 
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any cross-national differences in dialectical reasoning should also be reflected in 
differences in coopetive categorization. Therefore: 
 
H2: People in China will more likely categorize an attempt to outperform as 
cooperative. 
        
Further, given my two earlier predictions about the effects of coopetive categorization on 
ego-centric networks of working relationships, we can make inferences about the 
relationship between national culture and ego-centric networks.  If people in China are 
more likely to categorize attempts to outperform as cooperative, they should be more 
likely to both perceive their competitive working relationships as cooperative and share 
knowledge with their competitors.  Therefore, both behavioral and perceptual coopetition 
should be higher in China than in the US.  Because these cross-national differences are 
attributed to differences in categorization, the impact of national culture on the amount of 
coopetition should be mediated by coopetitive categorization.  Therefore:   
 
H3a: People in China will have a behaviorally more coopetive ego-centric 
network. 
H3b: The relationship between national culture and behavioral coopetition in the 
ego-centric network will be mediated by coopetitive categorization (the categorization of 
attempts to outperform as cooperative). 
H3c: People in China will have a perceptually more coopetive ego-centric 
network. 
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H3d: The relationship between national culture and perceptual coopetition in the ego-
centric network will be mediated by coopetitive categorization (the categorization of 
attempts to outperform as cooperative). 
 





In this study I examined both the influence of categorization and national culture 
on the amount of coopetition in ego-centric networks.  First, I predicted that people with 
higher coopetitive categorization would have a perceptually and behaviorally more 
coopetitive ego-centric network.  Second, I predicted that people in China (compared to 
people in the US) would have higher coopetitive categorization. .  Third, I predicted that 
people in China would have a perceptually and behaviorally more coopetitive ego-centric 
network, which would be attributed to coopetitive categorization. 
To empirically examine the hypotheses laid out, I conducted a two-part survey of 
working professionals in both the US and China. A survey of working professionals was 
necessary for collecting information about people’s current working relationships. In the 
first part of the study, I asked questions about categorizations and collected the names of 
people with whom participants’ had working relationships. In the second part of the 
study, I asked participants about the nature of each of their working relationships. 
PARTICIPANTS 
I tested the above hypotheses using categorization data and egocentric network 
data collected from working managers attending part-time MBA courses at a large public 
university in the United States and a large public university in the Peoples’ Republic of 
China.  A total of 75 managers in the United States and 55 managers in China 
participated in the study.  All of the participants in the United States used in the sample 
were Native English speakers
7
.  In the United States, 89% were Non-Hispanic White, 5% 
                                                          
7 We eliminated 32 subjects from the US sample who were not Native English speakers. 
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of the participants were Asian, 5% were Hispanic and 1% was African American.  In 
China, all participants were Han Chinese.  The average age of the US participants was 30 
and the average age of the Chinese participants was 32. Male participants comprised 74% 
of the US sample and 62% of the Chinese sample.  All participants had earned college 
degrees and had at least three years of full-time work experience.  Within each sample, 
each major industry, including technology, services and manufacturing, was represented.   
Participation in the study was voluntary.  To encourage participation, participants 
were provided with a random draw for a prize (a meal for two at a high end local 
restaurant).  A total of four prizes were given. 
PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS 
I collected data at two separate times in a paper-pencil format to reduce potential 
demand effects associated with asking questions about cooperative and competitive 
behaviors and cooperative and competitive relationships.   
The survey was originally constructed in English.  Two native Chinese speakers 
translated the survey into Chinese and compared translations to check for validity of 
items.  The Chinese survey was then back-translated and checked for accuracy with the 
original survey with two native English speakers.   
Time One Survey 
In the first part of the time one survey, participants were asked to generate a list 
of the people with whom they work within their organization, a common method used in 
ego-centric network analysis (Burt, 1997; Campbell & Lee, 1991). I limited the number 
of names they could list to 24 people and to those within their organization to ensure that 
the working relationships were most significant and not confounded by inter-
organizational relations. I asked for names on the time one survey so as to prevent any 
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influence on participants’ selection of names due to the particular kinds of network ties I 
would later ask about, a method used in previous ego-centric network studies in 
organizations (e.g., Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008).  I allowed them to use partial names 
or nicknames to aid any potential concerns over confidentiality. 
The remainder of the time one survey asked participants to categorize behaviors. 
I asked each participant to rate brief, one or two sentence descriptions of behaviors.  They 
rated all the behaviors three times, once each for whether the behavior could be 
categorized as cooperation, as commitment to the organization and as competition. I 
provided a 5-point scale (discussed later in the ―Measures‖ section) so they could indicate 
not only membership and non-membership but also strength of category membership. I 
asked about commitment so I could separate people’s considerations of the behaviors for 
cooperation and for competition, and so as to make it clear to participants that they could 
rate a given behavior as belonging to multiple categories. 
I included 25 behaviors.  Four items asked about attempts to outperform 
(discussed later in the ―Measures‖ section). The remaining items provided a range of 
behaviors likely to be categorized as very good and very poor examples of each category 
(cooperation, commitment and competition) so as to anchor people’s understanding of the 
scales, a method used typically in studies of categories (e.g., Weller, 2007).  The list of 
behaviors was presented in a different random order for each of the three times 
participants evaluated them. Across participants, half received each list of behaviors in 
one order, and half received each list of behaviors in the reverse order, to test for order 
effects. Also across participants, and orthogonal to the order manipulation, I 
counterbalanced the order of the categories participants considered. Half the participants 
rated behaviors for cooperation first and competition third, and half rated behaviors in the 
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reverse order.  Finally, participants provided demographic information about themselves 
and information about their organizations. 
Time Two Survey 
The time two survey occurred one to two weeks after the first survey. I provided 
each participant with the list of names they had provided on the time one survey. I asked 
them about the list of names three times, once each to rate the level of competition, of 
cooperation and of knowledge sharing in their relationship with each person on their list.  
I counterbalanced the order in which we asked about the different tie types. In one 
survey, cooperation was first and knowledge sharing was third, while the other survey 
listed them in the reverse order. At the end, I asked each participant to provide contextual 
information about each tie.8     
MEASURES 
Dependent Variables 
Perceptual Coopetiveness of Ego-Centric Network.  Each participant was 
asked to rate each working relationship separately.  For cooperation, they were asked to 
―please circle (rate) the extent to which you believe your working relationship with each 
of the people listed below is cooperative or non-cooperative.‖ For competition, they were 
asked to ―please circle (rate) the extent to which you believe your working relationship 
with each of the people listed below is competitive or non-competitive.‖  For each 
working relationship, participants were asked if the item indicated (with x being 
                                                          
8 I asked them whether the alter was a superior, subordinate or peer, whether the participant interacts 
formally on a daily basis with the alter, and whether the participant interacts informally on a daily basis 
with the alter.  Although there were significant results at the tie-level, they did not influence the impact of 
coopetitive categorization on coopetition in each tie.  For simplicity of results, I am not presenting tie-level 
data and thus not presenting results about these variables.  
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instantiated by ―cooperative‖ or ―competitive‖): 1 = ―very non-x‖, 2 = ―slightly non-x‖, 3 
= ‖ neither x nor non-x‖, 4 = ―slightly x‖ or 5 = ―very x‖.   
To measure the entire ego-centric network, I then calculated the within-
participant correlation of the participant’s score for cooperation and competition.  A more 
positive correlation indicates more coopetition, as relationships that are higher on 
cooperation are also higher on competition (and vice-versa).  
Behavioral Coopetiveness of Ego-Centric Network.  Each participant was also 
asked to ―circle (rate) how often you share work-related knowledge with each of the 
people you work with.‖ For each working relationship, participants were asked if the item 
indicated: 1 = ―I never share any knowledge‖, 2 = ―I rarely share any knowledge‖, 3 = ―I 
sometimes share knowledge‖, 4 = ―I often share knowledge‖ or 5 = ―I always share 
knowledge‖.  
To measure the entire ego-centric network, I then calculated the within-
participant correlation of the participant’s score for knowledge sharing and competition.  
A more positive correlation indicates more coopetition, as relationships that are higher on 
knowledge sharing are also higher on competition (and vice-versa). 
Independent Variables 
Coopetive Categorization:  I developed four items that represented instances of 
someone attempting to outperform others.  They were: 1) ―Someone attempts to 
outperform other colleagues in the organization‖, 2) ―Someone gauges others' 
performance and makes sure that he or she is doing better than the others‖, 3) ―Someone 
tries to get the quality of his or her work to be better than the quality of other colleagues' 
work‖, and 4) ―Someone tries to make sure that he or she isn't outdoing others in the 
organization‖ (reverse-coded).  I asked participants to rate these items, like all behaviors 
participants considered, on five-point scales concerning cooperation, competition and 
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commitment to the organization.  For each behavior, participants were asked if the item 
indicated (with x being instantiated by cooperation, competition or commitment to the 
organization): 1 = ―a strong indicator of non-x‖, 2 = ―a weak indicator of non-x‖, 3 = 
‖neither an indicator of x or non-x‖, 4 = ―a weak indicator of x‖ or 5 = ―a strong indicator 
of x‖.  From these data, I drew my measure of coopetive categorization. To simplify the 
presentation of results, I used as my measure of coopetitive categorization an aggregation 
of the ratings of four items as to whether they indicated cooperation/non-cooperation 
(α=.73).
9
  The same coopetitive categorization score for the participant was applied to 
each of the participant’s working relationships. 
National Culture:  A ―1‖ was applied to all participants (and their working 
relationships) that were in the United States.  Only native English speakers and US 
citizens were included in the sample.  A ―0‖ was applied to all participants (and their 
working relationships) that were in China.   
Control Variables 
Demographic Variables:  Age and gender were also included as control 
variables because they commonly influence interactions within organizations.10 
 
  
                                                          
9 I also found similar findings for more complex measures that included items relating to categorization of 
competition (including correlations of items and standardizing items), but chose to include this measure for 
ease of presentation.  There was a clear consensus within both nationalities that attempts to outperform 
indicated competition (MCH=3.90, MUS=3.70). 
10 Data was also collected on work experience, type of organization and organizational commitment, but 
data from these measures are not included in this study. 
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RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS AND CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS 
Means and Standard Deviations are presented separately for the US and China in 
Table 6.  First order correlations for the full sample are presented in Table 7.  Cross-
national comparisons revealed that people in China categorized attempts to outperform as 
more cooperative than people in the US (MCH=3.49, MUS=2.99, t(129) = 4.82, p<.001), 
supporting Hypothesis 2.  Moreover, people in China had, on average, a more 
perceptually coopetitive ego-centric network (MCH=0.17, MUS=-0.08, t(129) = 3.37 
p=<.05) and a more behaviorally coopetitive ego-centric network (MCH=0.21, MUS=-0.05, 
t(129) = 1.95 p=<.05) than people in the US. 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EGO-CENTRIC NETWORKS 
The correlation between perceptual coopetition and behavioral coopetition in ego-
centric networks was particularly high (r=0.68), indicating that the two measures indicate 
a perceptual and a behavioral aspect of the same ego-centric network.  To test for the 
impact of coopetitive categorization and national culture on the two ego-centric networks, 
I conducted two stepwise linear regression model analyses with the within-participant 
correlation scores for all cooperation/competition ties and knowledge sharing/competition 
ties. The results for perceptual coopetition in ego-centric networks are presented in Table 
8.  Coopetitive categorization predicted perceptual coopetition in ego-centric networks, 
thus supporting Hypothesis 1a.  National culture also predicted perceptual coopetition in 
ego-centric networks, thus supporting Hypothesis 3a.  To test Hypothesis 3b, I also ran a 
bootstrapped test of an indirect effect of national culture on perceptual coopetition in ego-
centric networks through coopetitive categorization (Preacher & Hayes, 2005).  The 
mean indirect effect was 0.07 (95% CI: 0.00-0.17), p < .05, providing evidence of 
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mediation.  Therefore, compared to people in the US, people in China were more likely to 
believe that a relatively more cooperative working relationship was also a relatively more 
competitive relationship, and their beliefs were partially attributed to coopetitive 
categorization.  
The results for behavioral coopetition in ego-centric networks are presented in 
Table 9.  Consistent with results for perceptual coopetition in ego-centric networks, 
coopetitive categorization predicted behavioral coopetition in ego-centric networks, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1b.  National culture also predicted behavioral coopetition in ego-
centric networks, thus supporting Hypothesis 3c.    To test for Hypothesis 3d, I ran a 
bootstrapped test of an indirect effect of national culture on behavioral coopetition in 
ego-centric networks through coopetitive categorization (Preacher & Hayes, 2005).  The 
mean indirect effect was 0.13 (95% CI: 0.04-0.23), p<0.05, providing evidence of 
mediation.  Therefore, compared to the US, people in China are more likely to share 
knowledge with people they believe are in a relatively more competitive working 





In this study, I examined the relationship between national culture, categorization 
and ego-centric networks of working relationships.  In particular, I examined the 
relationship between the categorization of attempts to outperform as cooperative or non-
cooperative and the propensity to engage in working relationships that are relatively both 
cooperative and competitive.  I also assessed whether people from a national culture with 
a reasoning style that emphasizes the integration of opposites, that of dialectical 
reasoning, would be more inclined to categorize attempts to outperform as cooperative 
and would more likely cooperate with people they believed were competitive.  In 
determining the impact of coopetitive categorization and national culture on patterns of 
working relationships, I examined the impact of coopetitive categorization on within-
participant correlations of cooperation/competition and knowledge sharing/competition in 
the person’s overall ego-centric network of intra-organizational working relationships. 
Overall, the results supported my predictions.  Coopetive categorization 
influenced both perceptual and behavioral coopetition in ego-centric networks.  National 
culture also predicted both coopetitive categorization and perceptual and behavioral 
coopetition in ego-centric networks.  Moreover, the propensity of people in China to 
cooperate more with others they perceive as more competitive was in part attributed to 
higher levels of coopetive categorization.   
COOPETITIVE CATEGORIZATION AND COOPETITION IN EGO-CENTRIC NETWORKS 
Previous studies on coopetition within organizations have focused on people’s 
motivation to engage in coopetive relationships.  The results from this study provided 
evidence that the way people categorize attempts to outperform influences the working 
 69 
relationships that people engage in.  Coopetitive categorization predicted whether people 
engaged in working relationships that they perceived as relatively more cooperative and 
competitive.  Coopetitive categorization also predicted whether they shared knowledge 
with people they perceived as in a relatively more competitive relationship.  These 
findings suggest it is possible that the formation of coopetition in ego-centric networks 
can be the result of people’s beliefs. The role of categories in perceiving and 
understanding behaviors and relationships provides an alternative explanation for why 
people form relationships that are both cooperative and competitive. This represents a 
theoretical advance in our understanding of cooperation and competition within 
organizations.    
The results also suggest that the categorization of attempts to outperform was 
related to sharing knowledge within relatively competitive working relationships.  This 
finding, in particular, has broad implications for organizations, as it suggests that the 
categorization of organizationally-beneficial behaviors influences people’s propensity to 
engage in multiple organizationally-beneficial behaviors.   Tournament theory explains 
that people’s attempts to outperform each other increases individual effort and the 
aggregate result of the individuals’ effort is beneficial to organizations (DeVaro, 2008; 
Lazear & Rosen, 1981). The act of knowledge sharing has been found to be beneficial to 
organizations (Kogut et al., 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Szulanski, 1996).  The findings from 
this study suggest that cognition influences the co-occurrence of both potentially-
beneficial behaviors.  
The results of this study therefore have implications for research on coopetition in 
organizations.  Previous research on coopetition has found that the presence of coopetive 
relationships improve firm performance (Luo et al, 2006).  My findings suggest that one 
possible explanation for this effect is how people interpret and react to attempts to 
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outperform.  The results found that people who believe that attempts to outperform are 
cooperative are more likely to share more knowledge with people who are more 
competitive with them.   This suggests that organizations with people who categorize 
attempts to outperform as both cooperative and competitive are more likely to find 
reciprocation with both attempts to outperform and knowledge sharing, rather than just 
one or the other, thus producing a net benefit to the organization overall.  Future research 
can address whether coopetitive categorization influences organizational outcomes and 
whether these outcomes are mediated by the formation of coopetive working 
relationships.  
The results of this study also have implications for research on cognition in social 
networks.  The results that attribute categorization to the content of ego-centric networks 
demonstrate that general lay beliefs about behaviors can influence people’s perceptions 
and behavior in ego-centric networks of working relationships.   Future research can 
address other general beliefs about behaviors. For example, people’s general beliefs 
about the specific behaviors that constitute trust may have an impact on people’s trust 
networks (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1997).  
NATIONAL CULTURE AND COOPETITION IN WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 
The results also revealed that the two national cultures of the US and China 
differed in coopetitive categorization and in perceptual and behavioral coopetition in ego-
centric networks.  People in China were more likely to categorize attempts to outperform 
as cooperative, more likely to perceive relatively more competitive relationships as 
relatively more cooperative, and share more knowledge with colleagues who were in a 
relatively more competitive relationship.  Moreover, differences between national 
cultures were mediated by coopetitive categorization.  The finding that people in China 
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engaged in more coopetitive categorization and were relatively more cooperative with 
people they were also relatively more competitive with provides new evidence of a 
relationship between national culture, cognition and social networks.    Because, as 
discussed earlier, categories are culturally-conditioned, future research can explore 
additional categories of behaviors that may differ by culture and have an impact on social 
networks. The connection between national culture and cognition also suggests that the 
way people categorize competitive behaviors is acquired, and therefore can be learned.  
Future research can address whether managerial mechanisms can influence the 
relationship between categories of cooperation and competition and networks of working 
relationships. 
LIMITATIONS 
This study has several limitations that can be addressed with future research.  
First, as an ego-centric analysis, the findings are limited to the ego’s perception of the 
relationship and does not include alters’ views of the relationship.  Future research can 
address how coopetive categorization influences the consistency of perceptions of 
working relationships among multiple people within an organization.  Second, the 
assessment of cultural differences in this study was limited to a cross-national 
comparison and did not include any examination of the cultural antecedents that are 
mediating cultural differences.  As Study 1 illustrates, dialectical reasoning does not only 
represent cross-national differences in reasoning, but also represents individual 
differences in reasoning.  Individual differences may relate to heterogeneity in cultural 
influences within each nation or individual differences in personality, such as the need for 
cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Tetlock, 1983). Future research can 
address this limitation by exploring dialectical reasoning as an individual-level difference 
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variable and its influence on people’s propensity to engage in coopetitive relationships.  
Third, my assessment of cultural differences were limited to a comparison between the 
US and China.  Future research can examine how other national cultures and other forms 
of culture (such as organizational culture) influence the relationship between coopetitive 
categorization and coopetive working relationships.  Finally, this study was limited to an 
assessment of one particular type of competitive behavior, that of attempts to outperform.  
Future research can address how the categorization of other behaviors can influence 
peoples’ coopetiveness of working relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this study offers a new perspective on culture and cognition in 
organizations by demonstrating that people’s thoughts about seemingly opposing yet 
fundamentally important categories, such as cooperation and competition, can influence 
how people perceive others in the organization and how they interact with others in the 
organization.  These thoughts are manifested in networks of organizational relationships, 
but national cultural differences suggest that the origin of the cognition is influenced by 
factors outside the organizational context.  The study therefore provides further evidence 






This dissertation provided a new perspective on the relationship between 
cooperation and competition.  Instead of explicitly theorizing about the relationship 
between cooperation and competition, I empirically examined people’s lay beliefs about 
the relationship.  In particular, I studied one type of competitive behavior that could 
potentially be categorized as cooperative; the attempt to outperform others.  I assessed the 
impact of people’s categorization of attempts to outperform others as cooperative or non-
cooperative (which I defined as coopetitive categorization) on multiple outcomes 
involving multiple populations (i.e., students and working professionals in the US and 
China).  I found that coopetitive categorization influenced people’s immediate behavioral 
and perceptual reactions to others’ attempts to outperform them, as well as people’s 
networks of ongoing working relationships. Therefore, the results of the dissertation 
suggest that whether people categorize competitive behaviors as exclusively competitive 
or both cooperative and competitive has both an immediate and long-term impact on 
people’s behavior in organizations.   
In this dissertation, I also examined culture as an antecedent coopetitive 
categorization.  I found national cultural differences in coopetitive categorization among 
both students and working professionals, and found that national cultural differences 
were mediated by dialectical reasoning, a general reasoning style about opposites with 
Eastern philosophical roots.  I also found national cultural differences in people’s 
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perceptual and behavioral reactions to others’ attempts to outperform, as well as people’s 
ego-centric networks of working relationships.  Each of these differences was partially 
attributed to coopetitive categorization.  Therefore, the results of the dissertation suggest 
that a culturally-shaped general reasoning style about opposites influences people’s 
immediate and long-term reactions to competitive behaviors.   
In each study of my dissertation, I discussed several specific implications of my 
findings for theory and research on teams and working relationships.  However, the 
implications of my findings are not limited to these two organizational contexts. First, 
cooperation and competition do not only occur in teams and working relationships.  For 
example, cooperation and competition are often discussed in research on inter-
departmental relationships (Tsai, 2002) and inter-firm relationships (Chen, 2008; Khanna, 
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998).  Future research can explore the influence of people’s beliefs 
about the relationship between cooperation and competition in each of these contexts.  
Second, cooperation and competition are not the only two categories in organizations that 
are conventionally treated as opposites.  Other examples are work and play (Glynn, 1888), 
superior and subordinate (Dienesh & Liden, 1996; Gerstner & Day, 1997) and employee 
and contractor (Pearce, 1993).  Future research can explore other outcomes of the 
influence of culturally-influenced reasoning about opposites on categorization. 
To summarize, people acquire basic beliefs about opposites from their cultural 
environment and these beliefs manifest into perceptions of others and behaviors that are 
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critical to organizations. This dissertation thus provides new evidence that the influence 




Appendix A: Brainstorming Task 
 
Sales Team Task Preparation 
 
In a few minutes, each of you will be placed at a computer where you will engage in a 
sales team exercise.  But before you begin that exercise, we would like for you to do the 
following: 
1. Introduce Yourselves. Please first let each member know your name, your major, 
the class that you are taking in the Management Department, and what you like 
about studying Management.   
 
2. Do a Brief Brainstorming Task. The sales task exercise you are about to do is 
about selling a new product into a new market.  Each of you has experience trying 
new products (new foods, new electronics, etc.).  Please jot down (as a group) 12 
actions that you believe a firm can do to successfully launch a new product into a 
new market.  The actions don’t have to be in order of priority. In the past, groups 
were able to generate at least 12 actions within five minutes.  Please use no more 




Appendix B: Instructions 
 
Safari Teas Sales Team Exercise 
DO NOT WRITE ON THIS.  In this exercise, you will be one of three people managing stands 
selling African teas for ―Safari Teas‖. You and your teammates will have to place orders for four 
kinds of tea:  
 hot regular tea (Hot-R)  hot and fruity tea (Hot-F) 
 cold regular tea (Cold-R)  cold and fruity tea(Cold-F) 
 
You and your teammates will also make decisions about offering free drink coupons to special 
customers. Each of you can offer: 
 0 coupons  10 coupons 
 20 coupons  30 coupons 
 
Each of you is sitting at your own computer, and has control over one stand’s orders and coupons 
for 25 ―days‖ of selling tea. In what follows, we will explain how to decide on your orders and 
coupon offers. You have two goals: 1) help your team get as high a possible profit within 25 
days as it can and 2) personally get as high a possible profit within 25 days as you can. 
When you first begin, you will select the color that corresponds with the dot that was given you.  
You will then have the opportunity to send and receive one message before the exercise to tell 
others how you feel.  Then a main window will open up.  ―Teammate A‖ and ―Teammate C‖ will 
appear as the other two colors that other teammates have (BLU, RED or GRN). 
The main window of the exercise looks like this (financial summary appears on Day 2): 
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On the following pages, we explain what each part of this window and explain what it means.  
Tea Orders 
 
Every day, you can adjust the orders for that day. You can type any number between 0 and 1000 
in each text box, or you can use the arrows to increase or decrease each order by 1. The order for 
each kind of tea is initially set at 100 for the first day. If you mistakenly enter more than 1000, it 
will revert to the last number you entered. Day 24 is the last day to set orders, and Day 25 will 
show final results. 
In addition to your own orders, the screen also shows you the orders your teammates made 
yesterday. 
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Your task in setting orders is to predict how many of each kind of tea will sell tomorrow for your 
stand. You want to be as accurate as possible: if you make more than you sell, there is a $1 per 
order cost for throwing it away, and if you do not order enough, you missed an opportunity to 




Every day, you can adjust how many coupons you will offer the next day. You can choose to 
offer 0, 10, 20 or 30 coupons, starting from Day 1. So can your teammates.  
Coupons bring rewards, but at a cost. If you offer more coupons than your teammates, you 
will earn more than they will. And if they offer more coupons than you, you will earn less 
than them. Further, if the team orders more than 30 coupons total, the team will lose money. 
Those with the fewest coupons will earn the least. 
 




As you go, you will get feedback about how many cups you sold, and how many cups were 
thrown away. You can look at your results or the results for each of your teammates from 
yesterday (―Yesterday Report‖) or from all prior days (―Cumulative Report‖) beginning on Day 2. 
These are located below the orders set for you and your teammates.  The reports on the left (right 
below your orders) are about you, the other two correspond with the teammates’ orders. Please 
note that the demand for your products is the same as others, with the only exception being any 
change in demand based on your performance. 
Each time you click on a report, it will show up in the window on the bottom-right. You can click 
as many times as you want.  
When you or your teammates click to look at reports, red letters appear that all teammates 
see, as in the TMA and TMC letters appearing. In this example, Teammate A is looking at 
Teammate A’s Yesterday Report and Teammate C is looking at Teammate C’s Cumulative 
Report. The BLU, GRN and RED letters will appear in your version, depending on your color.    
These red letters show ―who is gauging whom” throughout the process as you make adjustments 
to your orders.  You can use these reports to assess how you are doing in relationship to others, 




Once a day, there will be a message sent from Headquarters to one of the three teammates 
(including you).  This will include information that will be helpful to the entire team. If not today, 
it may be helpful later.  When one teammate receives a message from headquarters, you can 
forward the message to one or more of the teammates.  The ―Forward to‖ feature is then turned 
on.  You click on the recipient(s) and then click on ―Forward‖.   The quicker you send the 
message, the faster others can use it.  All messages are stored in ―Past Messages‖ for future 
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reference.  Messages will be sent from Headquarters to you, Teammate B, on Days 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 
18, 21 and 24.  If you click on ―Past Messages‖, it will show up in the window on the bottom-
right. 




From Day 2 onwards (not Day 1), you can see a Financial Summary for each teammate and a 
total for the whole team. CupProf= Yesterday’s profit based on the orders of cups. CumCupProf 
= Profit based on the orders of cups to date.  Coupons = Coupons chosen yesterday. CostAdj = 
The adjusted profit based on coupons used. CumCostAdj = the adjusted profit to date based on 
coupons used. CumTotal = The cumulative total profit.  The team results are on the bottom. The 
most important team number and personal number are on the right-- CumTotal.  And remember:  
Cumulative Total Profit = 
Total Profits from Cups + Total Profits from Cost Adjustment (from Coupons) 
 
Day, Time and Weather 
  
On the very top-left, it will show the Day, the time and the weather.  There are 25 days.  Each day 
lasts 60 seconds.  At the end of each day, three reports will appear (you cannot close them): 1) 
yesterday’s orders for everyone, 2) The financial summary for today and 3) any messages that 
were forwarded.  DO NOT CLICK AWAY FROM THESE PAGES DURING THIS 
TRANSITION BETWEEN DAYS. 











Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for China and US Participants 







Dialectical Reasoning 4.33 0.49 3.57 0.58 
Semantic Association 1.84 1.12 1.88 0.90 
Independent Self-Construal 4.49 0.63 5.31 0.74 
Group-Collective Self-Construal 5.23 0.82 4.63 0.99 
Age 21.25 1.64 20.32 1.09 
Gender (F) 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.49 
Perceived Difficulty of Task 4.45 1.56 4.65 1.61 
     
 
Categorization of Attempts to Outperform as Cooperative 
(Coopetive Categorization) 
3.70 0.47 2.68 0.67 
















Perception of Others’ Intention to Cooperate 





Table 2: First Order Pearson Correlations of Variables (N-=144) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Dialectical Reasoning *             
2. National Culture (US) -.58* *           
3. Semantic Association -.04 .02 *          
4. Independent Self-Construal -.57* .52* .17* *         
5. Group-Collective Self-Construal .24* -.32* .07 -.10 *        
6. Age .14 -.32* -.07 -.12 -.00 *       
7. Gender (F) .01 -.03 -.07 -.11 -.05 .09 *      
8. Value of Cooperation .35* -.41* .03 -.38* .20* .09 .15 *     
              
9. Coopetive Categorization .47* -.67* .11 -.28* .21* .18* -.07 .41* *   
10. Knowledge Sharing .38* -.35* .09 -.19* .13 .01 .18* .38* .37* * 
11. Perception of Others’ Intention 
to Cooperate 
.32* -.28* .18* -.12 .20* .07 -.02 .47* .35* .36* 
―*‖ for each correlation denotes p<.05 
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Constant 1.92 (1.03) 0.37(1.10) 3.70(0.85)* 2.46(1.00)* 
Semantic Association 0.11(0.06) 0.10(0.06) 0.08(0.05) 0.08(0.05) 
Independent Self-Construal -0.27(0.08)* -0.05(0.09) 0.06(0.07) 0.13(0.08) 
Group-Collective Self-Construal 0.14(0.06)* 0.08(0.06) -0.02(0.05) -0.03(0.05) 
Age (F) 0.09(0.04)* 0.07(0.04) -0.01(0.03) -0.01(0.03) 
Gender -0.15(0.13) -0.12(0.12) -0.12(0.10) -0.11(0.10) 
Dialectical Reasoning  0.48(0.11)*  0.22(0.10)* 
National Culture (US)   -1.09(0.12)* -0.99(0.13)* 
F 5.60* 8.57* 20.18* 18.59* 
R
2
 0.17 0.27 0.47 0.49 



















Constant 8.99(3.20)* 5.24(3.34) 2.99(3.68) 0.91(3.70) 
National Culture (US) -1.70(0.47)* -0.63(0.58) -1.19(0.49)* -0.39(0.57) 
Independent Self-Construal 0.10(0.27) 0.30(0.26) 0.44(0.15) 0.322(0.28) 
Group-Collective Self-Construal 0.08(0.21) 0.08(0.20) 0.01(0.01) 0.02(0.20) 
Age -0.21(0.13) -0.19(0.13) -0.21(-0.13) -0.19(0.12) 
Gender 1.00 (0.38)* 1.14(0.37)* 1.05(0.22)* 1.16(0.37)* 
Difficulty of Task -0.21(0.10)* -0.23(0.12)* -0.21(-0.13)* -0.22(0.12)* 
Coopetive Categorization  0.95(0.31)*  0.79(0.31)* 
Dialecticism   1.09(0.31)* 0.9(0.36)* 
F 4.89* 5.79* 5.77* 6.07* 
R
2
 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.23 



















Constant 4.96(1.62)* 3.26(1.70) 2.40(1.88) 1.44(1.89) 
National Culture (US) -0.56(0.24)* -0.08(0.29) -0.34(0.25) 0.03(0.29) 
Independent Self-Construal 0.03(0.14) -0.01(0.13) 0.17(0.14) 0.12(0.14) 
Group-Collective Self-Construal 0.13(0.10) 0.13(0.10) 0.10(0.10) 0.11(0.10) 
Age -0.01(0.01) 0.00(0.07) -0.01(0.06) 0.00(0.06) 
Gender -0.07(0.20) -0.01(-0.01) -0.05(0.19) 0.00(0.19) 
Difficulty of Task 0.04(0.06) 0.04(0.06) 0.04(0.06) 0.04(0.06) 
Coopetive Categorization  0.43(0.16)*  0.36(0.16)* 
Dialecticism   0.46(0.18)* 0.38(0.18)* 
F 2.26* 3.10* 2.95* 3.13* 
R
2
 0.09 0.10 0.13 .17 
Number denotes B coefficient. (x) denotes standard deviation. ―*‖ for each coefficient denotes p<.05 
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Correlation of Perceptual and Behavioral Cooperative Ties 
0.47 0.30 0.50 0.29 
 
Perceptual Coopetition in Ego-Centric Network 
 
 
0.17 0.40 -0.09 0.43 
Behavioral Coopetition in Ego-Centric Network 
 
0.22 0.47 0.05 0.43 
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Table 7: First Order Pearson Correlations of Variables (N=130) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Coopetitive Categorization * *  *  *  * * 
2. National Culture (US) -0.40* * * * * * 
3. Gender (% Female) 0.07 -0.13* * *  * * 
4. Age 0.06 -0.28* -0.05 * * * 
5. Correlation of Perceptual 





6. Perceptual Coopetition in 




7.Behavioral Coopetition in 
Ego-Centric Network 
0.36* -0.18 -0.10 0.15 0.02 0.68* 
―*‖ for each correlation denotes p<.05 
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Constant -0.18(0.32) -0.75(0.37)* 2.88(0.34) -2.62(0.42) 
Gender (F) -0.01(0.09) -0.03(0.09) -0.04(0.08) -0.05(0.09) 
Age 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) 
Coopetitive Categorization  0.18(0.05)*  0.13(0.06)* 
National Culture (US)   -0.27(0.08)* -0.20(0.09)* 
F 0.21 3.47* 3.85* 4.01* 
R
2
 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.13 




















Constant -0.39 (0.33) -1.16(0.37)* -0.14(0.36) -1.10(.43) 
Gender (F) -0.10(0.09) -0.13(0.09) -0.12(0.09) -0.13(0.09) 
Age 0.02(0.01) 0.02(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.02(0.01) 
Coopetitive Categorization  0.24(0.06)*  0.23(0.06)* 
National Culture (US)   -0.16(0.08)* -0.02(0.09)* 
F 2.00 7.17* 2.40* 5.35* 
R
2
 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.17 
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